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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was an extraordinary time, the years 2007 through 2009.  The world’s 
financial system shuddered.  Governments intervened.1  The U.S. Treasury 
invested billions of dollars in American financial institutions.2 
Many of these institutions were public companies, as their stocks were 
traded on national exchanges.3  Securities laws and regulations required 
those companies, and large investors in them, to file disclosure documents 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  These filings aimed 
to provide the public with information, including information about each 
company’s board of directors. 
Disclosure about boards is critical because boards occupy a special 
place in corporate governance.  Boards sit atop the corporate hierarchy. 
Boards control corporations.  In an important sense, a corporation’s board is 
the corporation. 
 
 1.  See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Troubled Assets Relief Program). 
 2.  See Meena Thiruvengadam, U.S. Bailouts So Far Total $2.98 Trillion, Official Says, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123851108664173877.html. 
 3.  Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 
253 n.2 (2009) (noting the financial institutions assisted by the federal government during the crisis, 
including: Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs). 
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Not surprisingly, therefore, as the federal government sought to 
influence the actions of financial companies at the epicenter of the credit 
crisis, the government turned its attention to those companies’ boards.  
Extending its powerful reach, the government in some cases effectively 
dictated which directors stayed, which left, and which joined anew.4  But 
neither the government nor the affected corporations timely disclosed these 
moves through public filings with the SEC.5  They didn’t have to.6 
The experience at two huge public companies, American International 
Group, Inc. (AIG) and Bank of America Corporation (BofA), provides a 
close-up look at this phenomenon.  The government’s actions to push some 
directors out at AIG and BofA, and to usher other directors in, were reported 
slowly and incompletely in the first case7—and not at all (until the press 
discovered the facts) in the second.8  Slow SEC filings at AIG and no SEC 
filings at BofA resulted, in part, from the federal government’s complete 
immunity from reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the Exchange Act).  But even had this blanket immunity been absent, 
other possibly relevant rules—designed to force private market actors to 
disclose their efforts to change public company boards—would not have 
required disclosure of the government’s moves. 
Using AIG and BofA as case studies, this Article makes a simple claim: 
When the government takes steps to change the composition of a board at a 
company that is publicly traded, a new SEC filing should report those steps, 
just as SEC filings must report the efforts of private market actors trying to 
change the directors.9  The analysis proceeds so: Part II describes the board 
change at AIG and BofA and the filings with the SEC that provided slow (in 
one case) or no (in the other) disclosure of the government’s efforts to 
change the directors at those companies.  Part III identifies one large hole in 
the law governing securities filings, and several more technical ones, that 
permitted government intervention in board composition to escape the 
prompt disclosure required when other market participants intervene.  Part 
IV argues that prompt revelation of who is influencing board change, and 
why they are doing so, is important for reasons both practical and 
theoretical—and that the securities laws and regulations already recognize 
 
 4.  For a discussion of how the government did, in two cases, effectuate a change in the board, 
see infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.4. 
 5.  See, e.g., infra Parts II.A.4, II.B.5. 
 6.  See, e.g., infra Part III. 
 7.  See infra Part II.A.4. 
 8.  See infra Part II.B.5. 
 9.  See infra Parts IV–V. 
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this truth by requiring timely disclosure of such efforts by private market 
actors.  Part V proposes a new securities rule that would require quick 
disclosure of government steps to change board composition at public 
companies and identifies a limited exception that should be included in the 
rule.  Because the government officials and companies involved may have 
their own incentives to avoid disclosure, only a new rule will effectively 
close the odd information loophole that permits the government to do what 
private market actors cannot: to take secret actions to change directors at 
publicly traded firms. 
II.  THE GOVERNMENT TAKES CONTROL OF TWO BOARDS 
In 2008 and 2009, the federal government put billions of bailout dollars 
into AIG and BofA.10  The government then engineered changes in the board 
of directors at each of those companies.  At AIG, securities filings 
effectively disclosed that the government had the power to dictate the 
composition of the AIG board, but the filings did not disclose the 
government’s use of that power in the departure of particular directors or 
disclose, in a timely way, the selection of new ones.11  At BofA, securities 
filings failed to disclose the government’s role in board change altogether.12 
A.  American International Group 
This section begins the AIG case study with the government 
investment.13  It then turns to the board change 14 and the government’s role 
in that change.15  The section ends by describing the securities filings that 
accompanied the board change, noting that some filings did not reveal the 
government’s action at all, while others did, but only long after the fact.16 
1.  The Government’s Shareholder Interest 
On the brink of collapse, AIG entered into a Credit Agreement with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on September 22, 2008.17  By that 
 
 10.  See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 11.  See infra Part II.A.4. 
 12.  See infra Part II.B.5. 
 13.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 14.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 15.  See infra  Part II.A.3. 
 16.  See infra Part II.A.4. 
 17.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008), at Ex. 99.1 (Credit 
Agreement between American International Group, Inc. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 
(Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement].  Throughout, I date all SEC 
documents by their filing. 
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agreement, the government provided an $85 billion revolving credit facility 
to AIG in exchange for, among other things, AIG’s promise to issue to the 
government preferred stock that would vote with the common stock on all 
matters submitted to the shareholders.18  The deal required the preferred 
stock to hold 79.9% of the total voting power at AIG19 and mandated that 
AIG issue the preferred stock to a trust that the government would create to 
hold that stock (the Trust).20  The Credit Agreement further and expressly 
required that AIG “use all reasonable efforts to cause the composition of 
[AIG’s] board of directors . . . to be, on or prior to the date that is ten days 
after the formation of the Trust, satisfactory to the Trust in its sole 
discretion.”21 
The government formed the Trust in mid-January 2009.22  The New 
 
 18.  Id. at 1, 43 (§ 5.11), Ex. D. 
 19.  Id. at Ex. D; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 6, 2009).  AIG 
received other assistance from the government during the credit crisis, and the government received 
other AIG securities as part of providing additional assistance.  For example, the U.S. Treasury 
purchased Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock from AIG on November 25, 
2008 for $40 billion.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2008).  For a 
summary of the assistance, and restructuring of the government aid, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 963–75 (2009).  Among other things, restructuring 
reduced the percentage of the government’s total voting power to 77.9%.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 6, 2008). 
  The government and AIG recast their relationship in January 2011.  AIG completely paid all 
amounts owing on the September 22, 2008 Credit Agreement.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Jan. 14, 2011).  AIG preferred stock held by the Trust described in the text converted to 
AIG common stock, and AIG preferred stock owned directly by the Treasury converted partly to 
AIG common stock, partly to a new class of preferred, and partly to interests in other special 
investment vehicles.  Id.  The Trust transferred all of its AIG common stock to the Treasury.  Id.  
After this recapitalization, the Treasury held 92% of all AIG common.  Id.  In May 2011, AIG sold 
100 million shares of AIG common stock to the public, and the government sold 200 million of its 
common shares to the public.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 27, 2011).  In 
2012, the government sold more than 206 million shares in March, more than 188 million in May, 
more than 188 million in August, almost 637 million in September, and more than 234 million in 
December.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 13, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 10, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 
8, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 14, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 14, 2012).  The last of these sales brought the government’s 
common stock holding in AIG to an end.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Rule 
424(b)(3)), at S-3 (dated Dec. 10, 2012, filed Dec. 12, 2012). 
 20.  AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement, supra note 17, at 43.  Section 1.01 of the 
agreement defines the “Trust.”  Id. at 19. 
 21.  Id. at 43 (§ 5.11). 
 22.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 23, 2009), Ex. 10.1 (Jan. 16, 2009), at 
2–3 [hereinafter AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement].  Subsection 1.01 formed the Trust.  Id. at 2.  
Subsection 2.01(a) stated that the trustees would establish a securities account.  Id. at 3.  Subsection 
2.02(a) stated that the preferred stock would be deposited in the securities account.  Id. at 4. 
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York Federal Reserve Bank appointed the trustees, “in consultation with the 
Treasury Department,”23 and AIG issued Series C Convertible Participating 
Preferred stock to the Trust on March 4, 2009.24  The trustees then 
“possess[ed] all right, title, and interest” in the shares25 and had “the 
exclusive right to exercise any and all voting . . . rights . . . attached to” those 
shares.26  The trustees held the stock “for the sole benefit of the Treasury.”27  
As AIG repeatedly acknowledged, the preferred stock gave the government 
the power to control director elections.28 
2.  The Board Change 
To see the government’s effect on the AIG board, we must trace the 
board’s composition back to the spring of 2008 and keep in mind that the 
government’s initial investment in the company—which included the 
condition that the government acquire voting control of AIG—occurred in 
September 2008.29  We must also recall that (i) directors are elected by 
shareholders at annual meetings;30 (ii) the sitting board, with the help of its 
nominating committee, nominates a slate of candidates—usually the 
incumbent directors—to run for director positions at the annual shareholder 
 
 23.  Id. at 2 (§ 1.02). 
 24.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar, 5, 2009); see also Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K/A) (Mar. 13, 2009), at Ex. 10.1 (Series C Convertible, Participating 
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement) (Mar. 1, 2009). 
 25.  AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement, supra note 22, at 3 (§ 2.01(a)). 
 26.  Id. at 6 (§ 2.04(a)). 
 27.  Id. at 3 (§ 2.01(a)). 
 28.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter AIG 
2008 Annual Report] (“As a result of its ownership of the Series C Preferred Stock, the 
[government-formed] Trust will be able . . . to elect all of AIG’s directors . . . .”); Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 12 (June 5, 2009) [hereinafter AIG 2009 Proxy Statement]. 
The government selected not only AIG’s board, but also its CEO.  Edward Liddy assumed the top 
executive spot “in connection with the transactions entered into between AIG and the NYFed and 
the Department of the Treasury.”  AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra, at 18; see also infra note 61.  
When Liddy later left the company—announcing his decision even before the 2009 shareholder 
meeting, id. at 15—AIG stated that the search for his replacement would “include participation by 
both the reconstituted Board of Directors,” which included a majority picked by the government, and 
“the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust.”  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(May 21, 2009).  As AIG had stated in its Annual Report for 2008, the government had the ability 
“to control . . . the selection and tenure of AIG’s Chief Executive Officer.”  AIG 2008 Annual 
Report, supra, at 27. 
 29.  “On March 1, 2009, AIG entered into the Series C Preferred Stock Purchcase agreement 
with the Trust . . . .  The aggregate purchase price . . . was $500,000, with an understanding that 
additional and independently sufficient consideration was also furnished in September 2008 by the 
NY Fed in the form of its $85 billion lending commitment under the Fed Credit Agreement.”  AIG 
2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 42. 
 30.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011). 
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meetings;31 and (iii) when directors resign or die during their term, the sitting 
board elects replacements who serve until the next annual meeting.32  
Accordingly, board change occurs only in two circumstances: when 
incumbents running for reelection lose in contested director elections,33 or 
when incumbent board members resign, die, or decline to run for reelection.  
In the latter case, their successors are either elected to the board—between 
shareholder meetings—by the sitting board, or nominated (usually by the 
sitting board) to run for election at the next annual meeting.34 
In this case, the AIG board nominated thirteen candidates for 
directorships in 2008.35  The shareholders elected all of them at the 2008 
AIG annual meeting in May of that year.36  All this occurred before the 
government bailout.37 
But after the September 22, 2008 bailout in which AIG agreed to give 
the federal government voting control,38 the board dramatically changed.  
Between the bailout and the 2009 election, eight directors including the CEO 
either resigned or decided against running for another term.39  The sitting 
 
 31.  See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04(b)(i) 
(2013), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL]. 
 32.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2011).  As an alternative to replacing a director who 
dies or resigns, the company can reduce the size of the board. 
 33.  This rarely happens.  A famous study found only forty-five instances in the period from 
1996 through 2005 in which “rivals seeking to oust incumbent [directors] succeeded in gaining 
control” of a company.  Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 687 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise].  In neither the AIG nor the BofA 
case was a director election contested and, accordingly, no director turnover at either company 
occurred as a result of a board member’s defeat in a shareholder vote. 
 34.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 223(a)(1). 
 35.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 7–9 (Apr. 4, 2008). 
 36.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 124 (Aug. 6, 2008). 
 37.  See AIG 2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 42. 
 38.  See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 39.  Between the 2008 election and the 2009 election, eleven directors left the board, with the 
dates of their departures showing that eight left after the September 22, 2008 deal.  Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 16, 2008) (concerning the departure of CEO Sullivan); Am. 
Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2008) (also concerning the departure of CEO 
Sullivan); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 17, 2008) (announcing Holbrooke 
resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 22, 2008) (announcing Futter 
resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 24, 2008) (announcing 
Willumstad resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 3, 2008) 
(announcing Langhammer resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 25, 
2009) (stating Tse not running for reelection); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 
31, 2009) (stating Rometty and Sutton not running for reelection); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (May 21, 2009) (stating Bollenbach, Feldstein, and Orr not running for 
reelection); see also AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13. 
01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:07 PM 
 
540 
board elected40 two new directors, one of whom was the new CEO, Edward 
Liddy.41  The board then nominated eleven candidates for election at the 
2009 shareholder meeting.42  The shareholders—with the government 
holding almost eighty percent of the votes—elected all of them43 to a board 
now reduced from thirteen to eleven members.44 
As the next section shows, the government had seized control. 
3.  The Government’s Role in the Change 
In evaluating the government’s influence on the radical restructuring of 
the AIG board, consider first the departures from the board.  Then consider 
the additions. 
It is fair to infer that the government caused or at the least agreed to the 
eight departures from the AIG board that occurred after AIG signed the 
Credit Agreement on September 22, 2008 and before the 2009 director 
elections.  Delaware law provided the government—once it acquired the 
majority voting power as a result of that agreement—the power to remove 
any AIG director, with or without cause.45  Thus, if a director had not 
resigned when the government wanted him or her to do so, the government 
could have simply forced the director out.  Moreover, the September 2008 
deal explicitly required AIG to use “all reasonable efforts to cause the 
composition of [the] board . . . to be . . . satisfactory to the Trust.”46  The 
government’s voting power, and the express language of the agreement, both 
strongly suggest that the government was behind the eight directors’ 
decisions to resign or decline to stand for reelection. 
Turning from departures to additions, AIG explicitly reported in its 
proxy statement for the 2009 shareholder meeting that “the U.S. Treasury in 
connection with transactions entered into between AIG and the New York 
Fed[eral Reserve Bank]” had recommended two of the eleven 2009 director 
 
 40.  As a Delaware corporation, AIG’s organic documents and applicable law permitted the 
board itself to fill vacant seats.  AIG 2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at cover page; see also 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2010); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 
3.1 (Jan. 17, 2008) (amending Bylaws section 2.2 to conform to the statute) [hereinafter AIG 
Bylaws]. 
 41.  Between the 2008 and 2009 shareholder meetings, the AIG board voted three new directors 
onto the board, with two of them voted on after September 22, 2008.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (July 17, 2008) (stating Johnson elected to the board by the board); Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 24, 2008) (stating the new CEO Edward Liddy elected 
to the board by the board); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) (stating 
Dammerman elected to the board by the board). 
 42.  AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13–15. 
 43.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 201 (Aug. 6, 2008). 
 44.  AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13–15. 
 45.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011). 
 46.  AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement, supra note 17, at 43 (§ 5.11). 
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nominees—including the new CEO.47  These were the two directors who had 
joined the board after the September 2008 deal, but before the next election, 
and who were then nominated for shareholders to elect for a full term.48  The 
proxy statement also said that five other director candidates were 
recommended by the trustees of the government-formed Trust that held the 
stock that the government had bought from AIG.49 
In short, we can infer with considerable confidence that the government 
sent the majority of the AIG board packing after taking voting control.  We 
know for certain that the government picked seven new directors, and that, 
after the 2009 election, those seven constituted a majority of an eleven-
director board.  The government seized—and then changed—the board, 
installing its own choices as the majority. 
4.  Disclosure of the Government’s Role 
In 2008 and 2009, AIG filed Forms 8-K disclosing that (i) the company 
had signed the agreement to issue preferred stock with controlling voting 
rights to the government; (ii) the government had formed the Trust to hold 
the preferred stock; and (iii) AIG had issued the preferred stock to the 
Trust.50  AIG attached the operative transaction documents to each of these 
filings and, in each case, the company filed the Form 8-K within four 
business days of the action the form reported.51  The public therefore knew, 
in a timely manner, that the government had the power to control AIG’s 
board membership.  But none of those filings revealed the government’s role 
in removing, or adding, particular directors to the AIG board.  And, while 
AIG also filed Forms 8-K to announce the resignation of sitting directors 
between the September 22, 2008 deal and the 2009 elections, and the 
election to the board (by the board) of new directors during that period, none 
of those Forms 8-K mentioned any government role in those individual 
goings or comings.52  Moreover, the government itself filed no document 
with the SEC to disclose any role it played in any director change at AIG. 
It was only in its publicly filed May 21 preliminary and June 5 final 
proxy statements for the director election at the 2009 shareholder meeting 
that AIG disclosed the role that the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank 
 
 47.  AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18. 
 48.  Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 49.  AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18. 
 50.  See supra notes 17–27. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See supra notes 39, 41. 
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of New York, and the Trust had played in recommending seven individuals, 
identified by name, for AIG directorships.53 
Five of these seven had never served on the board and were running for 
initial election.54  The disclosure of government involvement in the selection 
of these five was therefore timely because the government’s role was clear 
before they joined the board.55  However, the proxy statement also revealed 
that the government had recommended new CEO Liddy, who had joined the 
board in September 2008,56 nearly eight months before the proxy statement 
disclosure, and another director, who had joined the board in November 
2008,57 nearly six months before the disclosure.  And the proxy statement, 
like the Forms 8-K before it,58 said nothing about government influence in 
the departure of the eight directors who either left the AIG board between 
September 2008 and the 2009 shareholder meeting, or declined to seek 
reelection in 2009.59 
In sum, the government made no securities filing revealing its role in the 
AIG board change.  Nor did AIG disclose—until it filed its proxy statement 
for the 2009 election—the government’s actual role, as opposed to the 
power that its voting control provided, in the selection of two directors 
(including new CEO Liddy) who had been added to the board between the 
2008 and 2009 director elections. 
On the other hand, the AIG filings in September 2008 fully disclosed 
that the government was obtaining majority voting power at the company, 
and revealed at the same time that the deal with the government expressly 
required that the AIG board be acceptable to the government.60  From that 
timely reported transaction, any investor or other member of the public 
might have fairly assumed that the government was playing a central role in 
all decisions affecting the composition of the AIG board following the 
September 2008 deal.  Moreover, outside the SEC filings, the financial press 
reported that the government ousted AIG’s sitting CEO and replaced him 
 
 53. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Preliminary Proxy Materials (Schedule 14A), at 18 (May 21, 2009). 
Mr. Liddy and Mr. Dammerman were identified for the [AIG Nominating and 
Governance Committee of the AIG board] by members of the U.S. government in 
connection with the transactions entered into between AIG and the NY Fed and the 
Department of the Treasury. Ms. Koellner and Messrs. Golub, Lynch, Martinez and 
Miller were identified to the Committee by the trustees of the Trust [holding the stock 
giving controlling voting power to the government]. 
Id.; see also AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18. 
 54.  See AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See supra note 41. 
 57.  Id.  This other director was Dennis Dammerman. 
 58.  See supra notes 39, 41. 
 59.  See the preliminary and final proxy statements cited supra note 53. 
 60.  See supra notes 19, 21, 25 and accompanying text. 
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with Liddy—providing that information as those events unfolded.61 
Simply put, there were “holes” in the disclosure of government 
influence over AIG’s board change, but investors were by no means left 
entirely in the dark. 
B.  Bank of America 
BofA presents a very different case than does AIG because, although the 
government bought stock in BofA, that stock did not provide voting rights, 
and the government effected board change through regulatory action rather 
than through voting power.62  This section begins with the government’s 
investment in BofA,63 then describes the government’s regulatory move.64  It 
proceeds next to the board change65 and evaluates whether that change likely 
resulted from the regulatory action or other events.66  This section finishes 
 
 61.  Willumstad left the CEO position and the board, and Liddy was appointed the CEO and 
elected to the board on September 18, 2008.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 
24, 2008).  While the AIG securities filings at the time did not disclose the government’s hand in this 
change, the financial press reported that Treasury Secretary Paulson had personally asked 
Willumstad to step down as CEO and had tapped Liddy to succeed him. 
 As part of the [first bailout] deal, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson insisted that AIG’s 
chief executive, Robert Willumstad, step aside.  Mr. Paulson personally told Mr. 
Willumstad the news in a phone call on Tuesday, according to a person familiar with the 
call. 
 
. . . . 
 
Mr. Willumstad, who recently took over as AIG’s chief executive to try to turn around 
the firm, was surprised by the request.  “If that’s what you want, I’ll do it,” he said to Mr. 
Paulson, according to a person familiar with the call. AIG’s board was unhappy with the 
decision but felt it had no choice but to go along, as the only other option was 
bankruptcy. 
 
. . . . 
 
 By tapping Mr. Liddy as AIG’s next CEO, the government is turning to someone with 
deep experience in the insurance industry . . . . 
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 
2008, at A1.  The day after the changes, the financial press reported that Treasury Secretary Paulson 
had “asked Mr. Liddy to step in at AIG.”  Liam Pleven, The Financial Crisis: AIG’s New Chief Sees 
Smaller, Nimbler Firm, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A3. 
 62.  See infra Parts II.B.1–II.B.4. 
 63.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 64.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 65.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 66.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
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the BofA case study by describing the woefully inadequate securities 
filings.67 
1.  The Government’s Shareholder Interest 
On October 26, 2008, the U.S. Treasury agreed to pay $15 billion to 
Bank of America for Series N Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred 
Stock and a warrant to purchase more than 73 million shares of the bank’s 
common stock.68  On January 9, 2009, the Treasury agreed to pay another 
$10 billion to the bank, this time to purchase Series Q Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, and to replace the earlier warrant 
with one to purchase almost 122 million shares of common stock.69  On 
January 15, 2009, the Treasury agreed to pay an additional $20 billion to buy 
Series R Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock and a warrant to 
purchase an additional 150 million shares of common stock.70 
The preferred stock did not provide the government with even a single 
vote in director elections, unless BofA missed the mandatory dividend 
payments on the stock,71 which never happened.  And the warrants provided 
no voting rights.72  Moreover, in December 2009, BofA repurchased from 
the government all of the Series N, Series Q, and Series R preferred stock.73  
 
 67.  See infra Part II.B.5. 
 68.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter First BofA 
Bailout 8-K]. 
 69.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Second BofA 
Bailout 8-K].  The Treasury had contemplated buying $10 billion of preferred stock to be issued by 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill).  Since BofA bought Merrill, the government bought the stock 
from BofA.  At the same time, the government substituted, for its initial BofA warrant, a warrant 
entitling it to buy more BofA common stock.  Id. 
 70.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Third BofA 
Bailout 8-K]. 
 71.  In each case, the preferred stock carried the right to elect two directors if the bank missed six 
dividend payments, and the shares carried the right to vote as a class on mergers and on certain other 
matters, such as issuance by the bank of stock senior to the preferred stock the government was 
buying.  First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 3.1 A-8-9 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of 
Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N); Second BofA Bailout 
8-K, supra note 69, at Ex. 3.1 A-8-9 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate 
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series Q); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, at Ex. 3.1 
A-7-8 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred 
Stock, Series R).  But the preferred shares carried no voting rights other than the limited and specific 
ones set out in the deal documents.  First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a)); 
Second BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 69, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a)); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra 
note 70, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a)). 
 72.  First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 4.2 (§ 6) (Warrant to Purchase Common 
Stock); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, at Ex. 4.2 (§ 6) (Warrant to Purchase Common 
Stock). 
 73.  BofA announced on December 2, 2009 that it would repurchase all of the stock sold to the 
government.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 3, 2009).  On December 9, BofA 
reported that it had completed repurchasing all of that stock.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report 
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The government then sold the warrants—which it had never exercised—in 
March 2010.74  Thus, unlike the AIG case, the government never had any 
formal corporate power to dictate the composition of the BofA board. 
2.  The Government’s Regulatory Action 
The government’s lack of voting power, however, did not prevent it 
from pressuring BofA to change its board.  BofA is a bank holding 
company.75  It is therefore regulated by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (the Fed).76  Among the Fed’s many regulatory tools 
is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which the Fed can effectively 
force upon any bank holding company.  The Fed describes its MOUs as 
“highly structured, written but informal, agreements that are signed by both 
the Reserve Bank and the [regulated] bank’s board of directors.”77  The Fed 
uses MOUs “when a bank has multiple deficiencies” but “circumstances 
warrant a less severe response than those provided by formal supervisory 
actions.”78 
The financial press reported that BofA and federal bank regulators had 
entered into an MOU in early May 2009,79 after the bailout investment and 
before BofA repurchased the preferred stock.  According to the Wall Street 
Journal, the MOU required BofA “to overhaul its board.”80  As set out 
 
(Form 8-K), at Item 8.01(b) (Dec. 9, 2009). 
 74.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Mar. 9, 2010). 
 75.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 27, 2009). 
 76.  12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3)(F) (Supp. V 2011). 
 77.  FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS § 5040.1, at 6 (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/200904/5000.pdf [hereinafter FED. BANK 
EXAMINATION MANUAL]. 
 78.  Id.  Examples of formal disciplinary sanctions include (i) cease-and-desist orders issued 
when, for example, a bank is violating the law or engaging in an unsound banking practice, id. § 
5040.1 at 1, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2006); and (ii) removal of officers or other affiliated parties at 
banks when, for example, those officers or other affiliated parties have violated the law, engaged in 
unsafe and unsound practices, or violated fiduciary duties and that conduct has or probably will hurt 
the bank financially, and the acts of the officers or other affiliated parties involve dishonesty, 12 
U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  See also FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, § 5040.1 at 
1, 3. 
 79.  Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at C1 
[hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Obey] (reporting that “[t]he order was imposed in early May”). 
 80.  Id. (“[BofA] is operating under a secret regulatory sanction that requires it to overhaul its 
board . . . .”).  A later story details some of the inside-government history leading to the MOU.  
Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, With Feds, BofA’s Lewis Met His Match, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
9, 2009, at A16.  Although the MOU never surfaced publicly, the reliability of the paper publishing 
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below, that Wall Street Journal report did not repeat information provided 
by a securities filing, for no such filing revealed the MOU.81  And the story 
did not break until July 2009—weeks after the government had put the 
MOU in place.82 
3.  The Board Change 
As with AIG, understanding the government’s impact on board 
composition at BofA requires us to look back at the board as it existed 
before the government intervened.  Thus, at BofA’s April 29, 2009 annual 
meeting—less than a month before the government regulatory action—
shareholders elected eighteen directors.83  All of them were incumbents.84 
Almost immediately thereafter, the government and BofA signed the 
MOU, and the newly elected board quickly and drastically changed.  Within 
two months, nine—fully half—of the recently elected eighteen directors 
resigned.85  By the end of September, six new directors—all elected to the 
board by the sitting directors—joined the board.86  This left fifteen directors 
on the board, and the company reduced its board size to that number.87  The 
CEO, Ken Lewis, thereafter left his executive position and vacated his board 
 
the stories about it, the granularity of the second story’s account describing the run-up to the MOU, 
and the fact that BofA did, indeed, change half its board shortly after reports that the MOU was 
signed make, together, a very convincing case that the MOU existed and required the bank to change 
a considerable number of its directors. 
 81.  See Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79 (referring to the MOU as a “secret regulatory 
sanction”).  Review of BofA securities filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K after May 2009 reveals 
no reference to the MOU. 
 82.  Supra note 79. 
 83.  Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 211 (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinafter BofA 
2009 2Q 10-Q]. 
 84.  Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 15–17 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
 85.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 29, 2009) (announcing Sloan 
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 4, 2009) (announcing Tillman 
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 8, 2009) (announcing Ward and 
Mitchell resignations); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 19, 2009) (announcing 
Prueher and Franks resignations); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 31, 2009) 
(announcing Collins, Barnet, and Countryman resignations). 
 86.  As at AIG, the bank’s organic documents and applicable law permitted the board itself to fill 
vacant seats.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
BofA 2009 Annual Report] (“Bank of America Corporation . . . is a Delaware corporation.”); see 
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2011) (a vacancy on the board may be filled by vote of a 
majority of directors in office at time of the vacancy); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-
K), at Ex. 3.2 (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter BofA Bylaws] (amended and restated Bylaws, Art. IV § 4 
conforming to § 223); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 5) (stating Bies, 
Boardman, Jones, and Powell elected to the board by the board); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (August 21, 2009) (stating Scully elected to the board by the board); Bank of Am. Corp., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (September 21, 2009) (stating Holliday elected to the board by the 
board). 
 87.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Sept. 21, 2009). 
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seat.88  The board replaced Lewis with a new top executive, Brian 
Moynihan, and the sitting directors elected Moynihan to the board.89 
The company then reduced the number of directors to thirteen, effective 
at the 2010 annual meeting, and two of the fifteen incumbent directors did 
not stand for reelection.90  The thirteen 2010 nominees—all sitting directors, 
by virtue of the departures and arrivals between the 2009 and 2010 
elections—ran successfully for reelection at the 2010 annual shareholder 
meeting.91  After that 2010 election, only six directors remained from the 
original eighteen who had been elected in 2009, shortly before the MOU.92  
And those six now constituted a minority.  As the MOU reportedly directed, 
BofA had “overhauled” its board.93 
4.  The Government’s Role in the Change 
Because the board that the shareholders elected in 2010 was the board 
that was reconstituted by director departures and arrivals between the 2009 
and 2010 elections, this section concentrates on those departures and those 
arrivals.  The section considers departures first.  It considers arrivals second. 
Ten BofA directors resigned between the 2009 and 2010 shareholder 
meetings (the nine who left shortly after the MOU and the CEO who left 
later), and two declined to run for reelection.94  The government reportedly 
did not pressure the bank to push out CEO Ken Lewis,95 and the two 
directors who declined to run for reelection did so long after the May 2009 
MOU.96  So it is the nine directors who left between the early May MOU and 
 
 88.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 1, 2009) (noting that CEO Lewis 
advised the board that he would vacate both his executive and board positions effective January 31, 
2009). 
 89.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 17, 2009) (announcing Brian 
Moynihan elevated to chief executive and elected to the board by the board). 
 90.  Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter 
BofA 2010 Proxy Statement].  A comparison of the board before the election, id. at 10, with those 
standing for reelection, id. at 21, shows that directors Massey and Ryan did not seek reelection. 
 91.  Id. at 17–21; Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 3, 2010). 
 92.  Compare BofA 2009 2Q 10-Q, at 211 with Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(May 3, 2010). 
 93.  Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra notes 79–80. 
 94.  See supra notes 85, 88, 90. 
 95.  Louise Story & Eric Dash, Ending Rocky Tenure, Chief Is to Leave Bank of America, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at B1 (“[While] regulators have urged other management and board level 
changes at Bank of America,” “[f]ederal officials did not call on Mr. Lewis to step down.”).  All 
New York Times citations are to the Late Edition. 
 96.  BofA 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 90. 
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the end of July whose departure the government seems to have prompted. 
Of course, it is possible that these nine directors departed for reasons 
other than government pressure.  The directors may have resigned, in part, to 
avoid controversy. BofA’s 2009 election was contentious, with advocacy 
groups and longtime shareholders urging votes against incumbents 
(particularly CEO Ken Lewis),97 on ballots that permitted a vote “for” or 
“against” each director candidate even though each ran unopposed.98  As a 
result, the percentage of shares voted “for” several of the incumbents 
constituted, for corporate elections,99 an extremely low percentage of the 
total votes cast.100  The stockholders also approved a resolution,101 which the 
incumbent board opposed, to separate the board chair position from that of 
the CEO,102 thereby stripping CEO Lewis of his chairmanship.103  That 
 
 97.  Louise Story, Investors Air Discontent With Bank of America, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at 
B1 (stating that (i) two proxy advisory services—RiskMetrics Group and Glass, Lewis and 
Company—recommended voting against Ken Lewis, the CEO and board chair; (ii) CtW Investment 
Group, which works with union pension funds, led a campaign to vote against Lewis; and (iii) the 
Finger family, longstanding BofA shareholders, set up a website and broadcast television 
commercials encouraging votes against Lewis). 
 98.  See Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at Proxy Card (Mar. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter BofA 2009 Proxy Statement]. 
  Federal regulations require that a proxy form to vote shares in a director election “shall 
clearly provide . . . [one of several defined] means for security holders to withhold the authority to 
vote for each nominee,” or, “[i]f applicable state law gives legal effect to votes cast against a 
nominee,” the proxy form may “provide a . . . means for security holders to vote against each 
nominee” either instead of, or in addition to, the opportunity to withhold votes for the nominee.  17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2), Instruc. 2 (2012). 
 99.  In a sample of 2488 shareholder meetings in 2003 through 2005, 94.27% of shares voting 
were cast for director nominees on average.  Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. OF FIN. 2389, 
2397 Table 1 (2009). 
 100.  As examples, from BofA 2009 2Q 10-Q, supra note 83, at 211: 
Name 
Shares Voted For 
Number (Percent) 
Shares Voted Against 
Number (Percent) 
Shares 
Abstaining 
Number 
(Percent) 
Kenneth D. 
Lewis 
3,585,483,520 
(66.30%) 
1,739,904,717 
(32.17%) 
82,576,830 
(1.53%) 
Monica C. 
Lozano 
4,022,922,490 
(74.39%) 
1,316,622,875 
(24.35%) 
68,419,702 
(1.27%) 
O. Temple 
Sloan, Jr. 
3,330,503,450 
(61.59%) 
1,990,078,420 
(36.80%) 
87,383,197 
(1.62%) 
Robert L. 
Tillman 
4,040,832,297 
(74.72%) 
1,299,812,405 
(24.04%) 
67,320,365 
(1.24%) 
Jackie M. 
Ward 
3,833,873,175 
(70.89%) 
1,506,235,467 
(27.85%) 
67,856,425 
(1.25%) 
 
 101.  BofA 2009 2Q 10-Q, supra note 83, at 212. 
 102.  BofA 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 98, at 51–53. 
 103.  The resolution amended the company’s bylaws to require that the board chair be an 
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resolution created a public stir,104 and board members may have viewed the 
vote on that resolution as a rebuke. 
Another possibility is that directors departed in 2009 due to the 
continuing controversy surrounding BofA’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch 
through a deal signed on September 15, 2008105 and approved by the 
shareholders on December 5.106  That acquisition produced shareholder 
unrest for three reasons.  First, Merrill advised—after BofA shareholders 
voted in favor of the merger but before the transaction closed—that Merrill’s 
losses were dramatically higher than previously estimated, but the BofA 
board and management proceeded with the deal nevertheless.107  Second, 
Merrill paid about $3.6 billion in bonuses shortly before the merger, drawing 
criticism both because the bonuses appeared too generous for a then-failing 
company to pay108 and because the proxy statement urging BofA 
shareholders to approve the merger had not disclosed the bonus payments.109  
Third, Merrill’s former CEO resigned from his post-merger position at BofA 
amid stories that he had engineered the just-before-merger bonuses and had 
ostentatiously redecorated his office.110  All of this may have worn down 
BofA directors and motivated their departure. 
Finally, it is possible that public criticism of the board caused some or 
all of the nine to leave.  Press articles claimed that the BofA board was too 
 
“independent” director within the meaning of the New York Stock Exchange listing standards.  Id. at 
52.  A CEO is not independent under those standards.  NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra 
note 31, § 303A.02(b)(i). 
 104.  See, e.g., Louise Story, Big Loss for Lewis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at B1 (stating that 
“[Lewis was dealt] a stinging blow that leaves his stewardship and legacy in doubt” by a vote “[a]t a 
contentious annual . . . meeting” in which “angry investors held him accountable for what they view 
as a series of missteps that forced the once-mighty bank to accept . . . government bailouts”). 
 105.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 12, 2008). 
 106.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 5, 2008). 
 107.  See Julie Creswell, Price Paid for Merrill Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B1. 
 108.  Aaron Smith, Watchdog blasts Merrill bonuses, CNN MONEY, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/11/news/companies/merrill_bonuses/index.htm (reporting the New 
York Attorney General asking: “What did they do to deserve that money?” given that Merrill “has 
failed”); see Michael J. de la Merced & Louise Story, Nearly 700 at Merrill In Million-Dollar Club, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at B1 (noting that the New York Attorney General “raised hackles by 
disclosing how Merrill Lynch distributed its 2008 bonus” and “criticized Merrill for moving up the 
bonus payments to December, just before shareholders approved the merger [with BofA], instead of 
the usual time in January”). 
 109.  See Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09CV06829 (Aug. 3, 2009), 2009 
WL 2364171; see also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010 
WL 624581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 110.  Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Love Was Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, § 3 (Money and 
Business), at 1 (referring to “Mr. Thain’s lavish $1.2 million office renovation and last-minute 
bonuses that he paid out to Merrill employees days before the deal [with BofA] closed”). 
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close to the CEO.111  Such criticism may have hit particularly hard because 
BofA’s stock price dropped even more precipitously than stock prices of the 
company’s peers.112 
Since the nine board resignations started in May 2009,113 however, the 
timing tells.  These directors had already pulled through the awful wave of 
publicity surrounding the Merrill merger, and through the fractious April 
2009 shareholder meeting.114  The fact that they began resigning shortly after 
the MOU was signed led the Wall Street Journal to characterize the bank as 
having “responded swiftly” to the MOU by sending these directors out the 
door.115  Given the timing and press reports, the most persuasive inference is 
that the government—acting through its regulatory power rather than 
through its shareholding power—had a hand in the nine director departures 
in May through July of 2009. 
Less clear is what role the government played in the arrival of the seven 
new board members between the 2009 and 2010 elections.  BofA stated in 
 
 111.  Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Bank of America Board Under Gun From Critics, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1. 
 112.  
Date 
Value of $1 Invested on 
9/30/08 in BofA stock 
Value of $1 Invested on 
9/30/08 in Capitalization-
Weighted Index of Peer 
Companies 
9/30/08 1.00 1.00 
12/31/08 .41 .66 
4/29/09  
(date of director election at 
annual meeting) 
.25 .60 
5/29/09  
(date of first director 
resignation after MOU) 
 
.33 .69 
7/31/09  
(date of last director 
resignation in waive after 
MOU) 
.43 .71 
 
The peer companies used in this computation were Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, BB&T 
Corporation, Citigroup, Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., KeyCorp, 
Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, U.S. Bancorp, SunTrust Banks, Inc., and Wells Fargo & 
Company. 
 113.  O. Temple Sloan, Jr. resigned first.  Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 
29, 2009); see supra note 85. 
 114.  See David Ellis, Ken Lewis out as BofA chairman, CNN MONEY, Apr. 29, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/29/news/companies/bofa_shareholders/ (noting that “[v]otes at 
annual shareholder meetings usually do not reach [that] level of controversy” and “several investors 
were not shy about making known their feelings about . . . the past year”). 
 115.  The Wall Street Journal article reported that BofA had “responded swiftly” to the MOU, 
“with six directors resigning since May 26.”  Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79.  Three more departed 
shortly after this July 16, 2009 article appeared.  See supra note 85. 
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its 2010 proxy statement that one special committee of the board had found 
six of the seven directors appointed during that time, with the help of 
“outside legal counsel and third-party advisors,”116 and that a second special 
committee had identified the seventh new board member, the new CEO.117  
The proxy statement did not describe or refer to any government role in 
selecting any of these directors.  At least one story in the financial press, 
however, reported that the government had effectively exercised a veto 
power over the selection of the new chief executive.118 
5.  Disclosure of the Government’s Role 
As an “informal supervisory action,” an MOU is “not published or 
publicly available,” although according to the Fed a bank “may” have to 
disclose an MOU in the bank’s securities filings.119  Here, BofA did not 
include, describe, or even refer to its MOU in any SEC filing.120  And the 
government filed no disclosure document with the Commission setting out 
the government’s role in the bank’s board turnover.  In short, within a few 
months of shareholders electing a board at one of the largest financial 
institutions in the country, the government reportedly removed half of the 
directors and played a role, as well, in the selection of the bank’s new CEO, 
with no securities filing revealing the government role at all.121 
The absence of any such filing grates, particularly when comparing 
BofA to AIG.  At AIG, the market could have anticipated direct and 
conclusive government intervention in board composition, resulting from the 
publicly disclosed shift in voting control to the Treasury-created Trust.122  
But the government held no voting stock at BofA whatsoever.123  Instead of 
using publicly disclosed voting control, the government at BofA exercised 
 
 116.  BofA 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 90, at 6, 17. 
 117.  Id. at 8. 
 118.  Dan Fitzpatrick & Michael R. Crittenden, BofA to Select Emergency CEO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
5, 2009, at C3 (reporting that one BofA board committee was trying to select a possible replacement 
for Lewis if legal actions forced his quick departure and stating that “[r]egulators will be asked to 
sign off on the choice,” with “[a] separate Bank of America board committee formed on Friday . . . 
sifting through possible successors for Mr. Lewis, with the change to occur at year end . . . “; further 
reporting that “a narrowed list of candidates [assembled by this second committee] will be presented 
to the U.S. government for review. . . .”). 
 119.  FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6. 
 120.  See supra note 81. 
 121.  See supra notes 76–118 and accompanying text. 
 122.  Supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text. 
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its control by the publicly unavailable MOU, which only came to light 
through a reporter’s diligence, and then only weeks after the document was 
in place.124  Without the news reports on the MOU, no investor would have 
known that the government muscled half the BofA board out the door.  Even 
with the press reports, the market learned of the government involvement 
late. 
III.  HOLES IN SECURITIES LAW REPORTING THAT PERMIT GOVERNMENT 
CONTROL OF BOARDS TO REMAIN IN THE DARK 
With the AIG and BofA cases set out and the deficiencies in securities 
filings identified, we turn now to a central puzzle: how was it that the 
government could change the boards at huge, publicly traded companies 
without timely and complete securities filings describing the government’s 
maneuvers?  Securities law recognizes the importance of board change, 
imposing multiple requirements to disclose not only director departures and 
arrivals, but also plans to change board composition by major shareholders, 
shifts in control that could affect board composition, and even the names of 
those who recommend candidates for director seats at a shareholder 
election.125  This section sets out these disclosure requirements, explains why 
they left disclosure “holes” in the AIG and BofA board change cases, and 
shows why investors (and the wider public) had some information to “fill in 
the blanks” at AIG, but not at BofA. 
A.  Tender Offer Disclosure 
A party tendering for shares of a company may well wish to acquire, by 
the tender, a sufficient block of shares to change the board of directors—
either so that a reconstituted board will favor a full takeover by the tendering 
party or so that the company will make business changes that will increase 
the value of the stock that the tendering party owns.   Any party making a 
tender offer for stock of a public company must, if consummation of the 
tender would leave that tendering party with more than five percent of the 
company’s stock, file a Schedule TO.126  That Schedule TO—the basic 
tender offer disclosure document—must include “any plans, proposals or 
negotiations that relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny change in the present 
board of directors.”127  Since the government never made a tender offer for 
 
 124.  See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 125.  See infra Parts III.A–D, IV.B. 
 126.  15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1(a), 240.14d-3(a)(1) (2012). 
 127.  17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(4), 240.14d-100 (Item 6) (2012). 
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AIG or BofA stock, government action at those companies never triggered 
this “Schedule TO Disclosure.” 
B.  More-Than-Five-Percent Equity Shareholder Disclosure 
Any shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquiring more than five 
percent of any class of an “equity security” that is registered under section 
12 of the Securities Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D.128  That 
Schedule 13D must include “any plans or proposals which the reporting 
persons may have which relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny change in the 
present board of directors.”129  A first look suggests that this “Schedule 13D 
Disclosure” would have required the government to reveal its efforts to 
change the boards at AIG and BofA and, indeed, even its plans to undertake 
those efforts.  But closer examination shows that the government was able—
quite legally—to avoid any such obligation. 
Consider first the AIG case.  The government purchased all of the Series 
C Convertible Participating Preferred Stock that AIG sold.130  Even 
assuming that the Series C stock constituted a distinct “class”131 of an AIG 
equity security so that the government owned 100% of that class, the 
government was not obligated to make a Schedule 13D Disclosure for two 
reasons.  First, Exchange Act section 3(c) states that no provision of the Act 
applies to “any executive department or independent establishment of the 
United States . . . or any officer, agent, or employee of any such department 
[or] establishment” unless that provision specifically states that it so 
applies.132  Since section 13(d) does not specifically state that it applies to the 
 
 128.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78m(d)(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(a), 
240.13d-101 (2012). 
 129.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Item 4(d)). 
 130.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008). 
 131.  Section 13 contains no definition of a “class” of security.  Since section 13 refers to section 
12(g), which defines “class” “for purposes of [that] subsection” to mean “all securities of an issuer 
which are of substantially similar character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar 
rights,” 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(5) (2006), a section 13 “class” might be defined in that same way.  
Alternatively, a “class” might be defined by “the common usage of the day in the legal and financial 
worlds.”  Ellerin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1959).  Either way, a stock 
is a separate “class” if it has sufficiently important unique characteristics, including voting rights.  
Surely, the preferred stock that AIG sold to the government (which handed over voting control of the 
company) was a separate “class” for section 13(d).  And the labeling of that stock as a “series” 
instead of a “class” should not affect the analysis.  For an analogy, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1(d) 
(2012) (“If a class of a security is issuable in two or more series with different terms, each such 
series shall be deemed a separate class for the purposes of this section.”). 
 132.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006). 
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government,133 the government had no Schedule 13D Disclosure obligation, 
provided that the Trust holding the AIG stock for the government fit within 
the phrase “any executive department or independent establishment of the 
United States.”134 
That proviso posed no problem.  Since the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York created the Trust and the Trust held the AIG stock for the sole 
benefit of the U.S. Treasury,135 the Trust almost certainly qualified as an 
“independent establishment of the United States.”136  The courts interpret 
section 3(c) as applying to the Federal Reserve137 and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).138  Neither the Federal Reserve nor the FDIC 
seems closer to the section 3(c) description of protected entities than a trust 
established by the executive for the sole benefit of an executive department.  
Section 3(c) therefore applied, and cut the Schedule 13D Disclosure off at 
the knees. 
In addition, Schedule 13D Disclosure is required, with exceptions not 
relevant here, only when the security that the shareholder owns is registered 
pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act.139  AIG did not register the 
Series C Convertible Participating Preferred under section 12 of the 
Exchange Act140 and was not required to do so.141  Thus, the Schedule 13D 
 
 133.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). 
 134.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(c). 
 135.  AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement, supra note 22, § 1.01 (providing that the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York “hereby establishes a trust designated as the AIG Credit Facility Trust 
for the sole benefit of the [U.S.] Treasury”). 
 136.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(c). 
 137.  Howe v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, 194 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23–24 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 138.  Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 439 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D. Wis. 
1977). 
 139.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 140.  SEC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (2010) [hereinafter SEC Form 10-K], requires that 
companies list on the cover of the Form those stocks that they have registered under sections 12(b) 
and 12(g).  AIG’s Form 10-Ks for 2008 and 2009 listed other securities that AIG had registered 
under section 12, but did not list the Series C Convertible Participating Preferred.  AIG 2008 Annual 
Report, supra note 28; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010). 
 141.  Section 12(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits brokers from effecting transactions on a 
national exchange involving a security that is not registered under that Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) 
(2006).  This effectively requires issuers to register a security under section 12(b) if it is listed on an 
exchange.  Id. § 78l(b).  But the AIG Series C Preferred did not trade on any exchange. 
  Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 12g-1 required that a company register any 
class of equity security if (i) the issuer had total assets in excess of $10 million and (ii) the record 
owners of that class of security numbered 500 or more (since increased).  15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2009).  Both before and after the government bought the Series C Preferred 
on March 4, 2009, AIG had more than $10 million in assets.  See Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (May 7, 2009) (reporting more than $819 billion in assets on Mar. 31, 
2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Aug. 7, 2009) (reporting more than 
$830 billion on June 30, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Nov. 6, 
2009) (reporting more than $844 billion on Sept. 30, 2009).  But the government was the only 
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Disclosure obligation would not have applied to the government, by reason 
of its ownership of the Series C stock, even if section 3(c) had not 
categorically precluded the application of section 13 to Uncle Sam. 
Turning from the AIG case to the BofA case, the government’s case for 
making no Schedule 13D Disclosure was even stronger.  Again assume that 
each series of preferred stock that the government bought from BofA 
constituted a separate “class” for section 13(d) analysis (with the Treasury 
owning 100% of each such class).142  Even so, the section 3(c) exemption 
relieved the government of any Schedule 13D Disclosure obligation.143  
Moreover, BofA—like AIG—did not have to register the government-
purchased preferred stock under Exchange Act section 12 and did not 
register that stock under that section, which meant that section 13(d) did not 
apply to the owner of that stock.144  Finally, the preferred stock that the 
government bought from BofA provided no voting rights unless BofA 
missed dividend payments owed on that stock.145  Since BofA never missed 
dividend payments, that BofA preferred stock never had a current vote in 
 
purchaser of the Series C—far below the 500 minimum necessary to trigger a section 12(g) 
registration. 
 142.  Whether a series of preferred stock constitutes a separate “class” depends on its unique 
characteristics.  See supra note 131.  Arguably, the Series N and Series R preferred stock that the 
government purchased from the bank constituted a separate “class” because that stock uniquely 
subjected the bank’s compensation to federal government control.  First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra 
note 68, Ex. 3.1 Annex A § 4.10 (series N designations, requiring BofA to “take all necessary steps 
to ensure that its Benefit Plans with respect to Senior Executive Officers comply in all respects with 
§ 111(b) of the [Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765] as implemented by any guidance or regulation . . . that has been issued and is in effect as of 
the Closing Date”); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, Ex. 10.1 § 4.10 (Stock Purchase 
Agreement, including the same requirement as the series N designation); see BofA 2010 Proxy 
Statement, supra note 90, at 28 (reporting that the “amount and form” of compensation paid to 
certain bank executives was subject to specific federal approval). 
 143.  The argument for the section 3(c) exclusion is even stronger in the BofA case, since the 
Treasury itself, rather than a trust, owned the BofA stock.  See supra text accompanying notes 68–
70. 
 144.  The covers to BofA’s Forms 10-K for the years 2008 and 2009 list other securities that the 
company had registered under section 12 but not the Series N, Q, or R Fixed Rate Cumulative 
Perpetual Preferred Stock issued to the government.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) (Feb. 27, 2009); Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010). 
  Just as the federal securities laws did not require AIG to register the preferred stock it sold to 
the government, those laws did not require BofA to register the preferred stock that BofA sold to the 
United States.  Only one shareholder owned the preferred series that the government bought from the 
bank, so the section 12(g) registration requirement—triggered in part by 500 or more shareholders of 
record—did not apply.  See supra note 141.  Further, the BofA Series N and R preferred stock did 
not trade on any exchange, and hence did not need registration under sections 12(a) or (b). 
 145.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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director elections and was accordingly never an “equity security”146 falling 
within the coverage of section 13(d) at all. 
C.  Form 8-K Disclosure 
Form 8-K requires public companies to disclose any of more than 
twenty different events shortly after they occur.147  Three of the described 
events are particularly pertinent here. 
1.  Director Change 
Within four business days of a director’s resignation or refusal to stand 
for reelection, a public company must file a Form 8-K disclosing that fact.148  
Moreover, when a director resigns or declines to stand for reelection 
“because of a disagreement with [the company on whose board he or she 
sits] . . . on any matter relating to the [company’s] operations, policies, or 
practices,” 149 the company not only must disclose the departure or refusal, 
but must also describe the disagreement.150  Here, AIG and BofA dutifully 
reported director departures but did not, in any of the filings, report any 
“disagreement” between the board member heading offstage and the 
company over company “operations, policies[,] or practices.”151  There easily 
could have been none, even if the government pressed the director to leave.  
The director might have simply agreed to leave for the good of the company, 
reasoning that the company needed government financial or regulatory 
support (or both) and that, if leaving would improve the chance of that 
support, then leaving was the right thing to do.  In that case, even if the 
director disagreed with the government that he or she should leave, any such 
disagreement might have been appropriately characterized as no 
disagreement with the company, and thus not subject to mandatory reporting 
in an 8-K filing.  A good argument for this position—whether it necessarily 
would have survived scrutiny before a court or the SEC—could have been 
enough to convince AIG or BofA that none of the directors left as a result of 
any such “disagreement.”152 
Putting it another way, the Form 8-K director change disclosure—
 
 146.  SEC rules exclude “non-voting securities” from the definition of “equity securities,” and 
define “voting securities” as those “the holders of which are presently entitled to vote for the election 
of directors.”  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(i), 240.12b-2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 147.  SEC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form 
8-k.pdf [hereinafter SEC Form 8-K]. 
 148.  Id. at Item 5.02(a)–(b), General Instruction B.1. 
 149.  Id. at Item 5.02(a). 
 150.  Id. at Item 5.02(a)(1)(iii). 
 151.  See the Form 8-Ks identified in notes 39, 85 supra. 
 152.  SEC, Current Report (Form 8-K) at Item 5.02(a)(1). 
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though broadly phrased to pick up intra-company controversy leading to a 
director departure—simply does not contemplate influence from outside the 
company to remove a director.  In the private sphere, outside pressure to 
remove directors might come from a large shareholder or perhaps a hostile 
bidder making a tender offer.  The Schedule 13D Disclosure and the 
Schedule TO Disclosure would, respectively, require those private actors to 
disclose plans to change the board and thereby make up for any deficiency in 
the 8-K disclosure.153  But, as we have seen, neither of those shareholder 
disclosure mandates applied to the government’s actions at AIG or BofA. 
In addition to director departures, Form 8-K requires public companies 
to disclose, within four days, the election by the board of new directors who 
join the board between shareholder meetings.154  This disclosure must 
include “a brief description of any arrangement or understanding between 
the new director and any other persons, naming such persons, pursuant to 
which such director was selected as a director.”155  None of the Forms 8-K 
announcing new directors who joined the AIG or BofA boards between 
shareholder meetings included any statement about any such “arrangement 
or understanding.”156  Of course, the government could have had an 
“arrangement or understanding”157 with the company (AIG or BofA) 
pursuant to which the new director joined the board.  But Form 8-K 
identifies the only reportable “arrangement or understanding” as one 
between “any other person[]” and “the new director.”158 
2.  Material Definitive Agreement 
A public company must file a Form 8-K to disclose, within four days, 
the company’s entry into a material definitive agreement that is not made in 
the ordinary course of business.159  AIG and BofA filed Forms 8-K to 
comply with this requirement when those companies entered into the deals 
by which the government bought the preferred stock issued by each of those 
corporations.160  Both AIG and BofA attached the deal documents to their 
 
 153.  See supra Parts III.A., III.B., III.C.1. 
 154.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147 at Item 5.02(d). 
 155.  Id. at Item 5.02(d)(2). 
 156.  See the Forms 8-K identified in notes 41, 86 supra. 
 157.  Supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147 at Item 1.01(a), General Instruction B.1. 
 160.  When a company files a Form 8-K, that filing must “contain the number . . . of the 
applicable item.”  Id. at General Instruction D.  The Forms 8-K that AIG and BofA filed to describe 
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Forms 8-K and thereby fully disclosed all terms of the preferred stock that 
the government bought.161 
The full report of the AIG transaction—disclosing the shift of voting 
power on all matters (including director elections) to the government and the 
express statement in the deal documents that the AIG board must be 
satisfactory to the trustees of the Trust that would hold the stock for the 
government—was enough to signal that the government would control who 
stayed on the AIG board, who left the board, and who joined that board.162 
But the reports of the BofA transactions did nothing of the sort.163  The 
government’s purchases of preferred stock from BofA provided no right to 
even a single vote in director elections, unless the bank missed required 
dividend payments.164  The warrants provided no voting rights at any time.165  
Thus, by the transaction documents that BofA attached to its Forms 8-K, 
investors could see that the stock and warrants did not provide voting rights 
and, therefore, investors would not have gleaned from the description of 
those investments that the government was effecting board change. 
Moreover, neither company filed any “material definitive agreement”  
Form 8-K that separately discussed government influence on the departure 
or arrival of individual directors.  Most important in this regard is BofA’s 
failure to file an 8-K to disclose, as a material definitive agreement, the 
existence and the terms of the MOU by which, according to press reports, 
the bank agreed to radically reconfigure its board.166 
Though at first consideration surprising, the bank’s decision against 
such disclosure arguably complied with Form 8-K requirements.  Form 8-K 
defines a “material definitive agreement” as “an agreement that provides for 
obligations that are material to and enforceable against the [company], or 
rights that are material to the [company] and enforceable by the 
[company].”167  An obligation to change the board of directors would be 
“material” for all the reasons set out in Part IV.B below.  But as an “informal 
supervisory action,” the MOU was, in the Fed’s view, “not enforceable.”168  
 
sales of preferred stock to the government stated that they were filed to comply with Item 1.01.  See 
the Forms 8-K identified in notes 17, 68–70 supra.  Both companies also filed—for the bailout 
transactions—Forms 8-K under Item 3.02 (requiring disclosure of the sale of unregistered 
securities), Item 3.03 (requiring disclosure of events that materially modify the rights of existing 
securities holders), and Item 5.03 (requiring disclosure of amendments to articles of incorporation).  
See the Forms 8-K identified in notes 24, 68–70 supra. 
 161.  See supra notes 17, 22, 24, 68–70. 
 162.  Supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See supra Part II.B.5. 
 164.  Supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See supra Part II.B.5 
 167.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 1.01(b). 
 168.  FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6. 
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And, as an unenforceable agreement, it fell outside the 8-K definition of 
“material definitive agreements.”169  Of course, as a practical matter, most 
banks’ managements and boards will comply with a “supervisory action” by 
its primary regulator, even if that action is “informal” and in some sense not 
“enforceable.”170  But by applying pressure through an MOU, the 
government (intentionally or not) armed the bank with a persuasive 
argument that the Fed’s pressure to change the BofA board need not be 
publicly reported.171  Disclosure was not clearly required. 
3.  Change of Control 
A public company must file a Form 8-K within four business days after 
its board or its officers learn that “a change in control . . . has occurred.”172  
When it sold the voting stock to the government in March 2009, AIG filed a 
Form 8-K pursuant to this requirement.173  But BofA never filed such a Form 
8-K to disclose the control that the government exercised by the MOU.174  It 
is difficult to know why.  The portion of Form 8-K concerning change of 
control does focus in part on “the percentage of voting securities” owned by 
the party taking control,175 and, as set out above, the government held no 
securities with voting rights at the bank.  But the securities law definition of 
“control” is broad, extending expansively to power from any source, 
whether exercised “through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, 
or otherwise.”176  Perhaps BofA did not file a change of control Form 8-K 
because the MOU affected only selected aspects of BofA’s operations and 
governance, whereas control, as defined by the SEC, is arguably broader—
the “power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies” 
of a company.177  By this interpretation, or maybe because the MOU was not 
“enforceable” and therefore perhaps could not provide “control,” a Form 8-
K to disclose the MOU as a change of control was arguably not required. 
 
 169.  See SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 1.01(b). 
 170.  If the bank fails to comply, the Fed can impose other, mandatory, enforcement measures.  
See supra note 78. 
 171.  Obviously, if in another case the government applied pressure without an “agreement” at all, 
the Form 8-K requirement to disclose material definitive agreements would not apply. 
 172.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 5.01(a), General Instruction B.1. 
 173.  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 5, 2009). 
 174.  See supra Part II.B.5. 
 175.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 5.01(a)(3). 
 176.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 177.  Id. 
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D.  Proxy Disclosure 
The federal proxy rules require that a company state how it came to 
nominate a director candidate.178  Specifically, when the nominating 
committee of a public company’s board puts forward a director candidate for 
a vote at a shareholder meeting and the board seeks proxies to vote shares 
for that nominee, the company must disclose “which one or more of the 
following categories of persons or entities recommended [the] nominee: 
[s]ecurity holder, non-management director, chief executive officer, other 
executive officer, third-party search firm, or other specified source.”179 
While this disclosure requirement seems tailor-made for the kind of 
influence that the government might exercise over a company’s board, there 
is a timing problem.  The proxy rule requirement to identify the source of a 
nominee applies only when a company files and distributes its proxy 
statement seeking votes for director candidates that the company’s board has 
nominated.180  Thus, a company whose board elects a director to the board 
between shareholder meetings will not have to disclose the party 
recommending the new director until the director runs for reelection at the 
next shareholder meeting, which may be months away.181  It is this timing 
problem that created the late disclosures about Liddy and one other director 
at AIG: they joined the board months before the company was required, by 
the proxy statement rule, to describe the government role in their 
ascension.182 
E.  The Holes in Whole 
The government’s general exemption from Exchange Act compliance 
categorically excuses it from any reporting under that Act when the 
 
 178.  17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c) (2012) (Item 407). 
 179.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2012) (emphasis added) (Item 7(d), cross-referencing Reg. S-K 
Item 407(c)(2) at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2), which includes the quoted requirement in subpart (vii)). 
 180.   The proxy disclosure schedule in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 only applies to a company when 
the company seeks shareholder proxies.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-2, 14a-3(a)(1).  And Item 7(d) of that 
disclosure schedule—by its terms—only applies if, at the shareholder meeting for which proxies are 
sought, “action is to be taken with respect to the election of directors.” 
 181.  This rule does not apply to nominees who are “directors standing for reelection.”  Id.  Read 
literally, therefore, the rule appears to exempt directors who are elected to a board, by the board, 
between shareholder meetings because, by the time they are listed on the company’s proxy card, 
those directors are “standing for reelection.”  The SEC has, however, foreclosed that reading.  SEC, 
Item 407 of Regulation S-K—Corporate Governance at Question 3.02 (Mar. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcomp407interp.htm. 
 182.  Liddy joined the board in September 2008 and Dammerman in November 2008.  See supra 
note 41.  AIG filed its preliminary proxy statement for the next director election on May 21, 2009.  
See supra note 53. 
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government actively seeks to change the board at a public company.183  The 
loophole remains open even when the government holds a majority voting 
interest in a company, as it did in AIG.184  With the government not required 
to report its influence on board changes, the only other party in a position to 
do so is the company whose board the government affects.  Yet gaps in the 
statutes and rules permit a company to avoid or delay disclosure as well.185  
None of the existing disclosure rules requires that the company disclose 
government pressure to remove board members, unless that pressure results 
in a disagreement between a departing director and the company, or the 
government applies pressure through an “enforceable” agreement.186  
Existing rules require company disclosure of government pressure to add an 
individual to a board, but only if the government “recommends” that 
individual to the company’s board, or the government applies pressure 
through an “enforceable” agreement with the company, or the government 
has an “arrangement or understanding” with the newly appointed director.187  
A banking company subject to an “informal” enforcement action by a 
federal regulator can avoid disclosing that the agency is pressing for a board 
change through a “material definitive agreement” because the “informal” 
action is not “enforceable.”188  And, even when the government 
“recommends” a candidate who joins a board between shareholder meetings, 
the government may have no arrangement or understanding with the new 
director, so that the company need not disclose the government’s role until 
the director runs for election at the next annual shareholder meeting.189 
In sum, the most likely applicable disclosure rules have holes through 
which timely and complete disclosure of government efforts to change a 
public company’s board can slip.  And slip it did in the AIG case, even more 
so in that of BofA.190 
IV.  WHY WE SHOULD PLUG THE HOLES 
Thus far, the discussion has examined government influence on the 
composition of boards at two public companies, demonstrated that securities 
 
 183.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See supra Part III.A–D. 
 186.  See supra Part III.C.1–2. 
 187.  See supra Part III.C.1–2, D. 
 188.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 189.  See supra Part III.C.1, D. 
 190.  See supra Parts II.A.4, and II.B.5. 
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filings did not fully disclose that influence, and provided the technical 
reasons for the disclosure gap.191  The analysis now turns to why we should 
close the gap.  This section focuses, first, on the central place that the board 
occupies in a corporation192 and, second, on the express recognition in 
existing securities regulations that disclosure of board changes—and 
disclosure of who influences those changes—is important.193  The section 
then argues, third, that all major theories of the corporation attribute 
importance to the composition of a board and, expressly or implicitly, 
attribute significance to the identity of those who control board 
composition.194  Fourth and finally, this section addresses two strains of 
academic thought that go the other way—one arguing that, despite their lofty 
formal status, boards wield little practical influence, and the other arguing 
that shareholder control of board composition is an illusion.195  While those 
scholarly contentions imply that the disclosure deficiencies identified in this 
Article need not concern us, regulatory actions addressing these very 
matters, as well as increased shareholder activism, demonstrate that the 
disclosure holes are important after all. 
A.  The Board’s Formal and Practical Control of a Company 
The law grants sweeping power to a corporation’s board.  State 
corporate law—represented for the purposes of this Article by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law196—provides that “[t]he business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors.”197  The board serves as a kind of benign oligarchy looking out 
for the company’s long-term health and, in so doing, enjoys the authority to 
act even in ways that harm shareholders in the short term.  For example, 
although shareholders must vote to approve a merger, a merger agreement 
only goes to a shareholder vote after the board has approved the deal.198  
Accordingly, a board can “just say ‘no’” to a premium offer that would 
reward shareholders with a certain and immediate gain on the basis that the 
merger interferes with a long-term strategy that the board has adopted in the 
 
 191.  See supra Parts II–III. 
 192.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 193.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 194.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 195.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 196.  Delaware supplies the prevalent law.  Division of Corporations, STATE OF DELAWARE, 
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (“more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded 
companies and 63% of the Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware).  The laws of other states 
vary on some of the matters discussed below. 
 197.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
 198.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011). 
01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:07 PM 
[Vol. 40: 533, 2013] Investors Should Know 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
563 
hope to generate projected (but uncertain) out-year gains.199  When a board 
says “no,” the shareholders never vote on the premium offer at all, and, 
absent a tender offer, do not receive the immediate premium.200  Even when 
a potential acquirer makes a tender offer, a board can defeat the offer by 
adopting a “poison pill” and declining to redeem the pill during a takeover 
battle.201  The board’s power to thereby control shareholder access to 
bountiful buyouts has important effects on investors.  Shareholders in 
companies whose boards successfully resist acquisitions reap, on average, 
lower returns than shareholders in companies that are acquired.202 
Just as the board plays a central role in takeovers, it plays a key role in 
 
 199.  See Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1154 (Del. 1989). 
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon [as when a board has put 
a company up for immediate sale], a board of directors, while always required to act in an 
informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short 
term, even in the context of a takeover. 
 
. . . . 
 
The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame 
for achievement of corporate goals.  That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. 
[Smith v.] Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d [858,] 873 [(Del. 1985)].  Directors are not obliged to 
abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit 
unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  While a board’s vote to “just say ‘no’” to a premium offer is limited 
by fiduciary duties, courts review such decisions for breach of the duty of care, applying the business 
judgment rule. Provided that the directors’ procedure for reaching their conclusion (including the 
manner in which they inform themselves of facts) does not constitute gross negligence and the 
directors act in good faith, the directors commit no duty of care violation.  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 
873; see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (elsewhere, overruling Van 
Gorkom on an unrelated point). 
 200.  See generally  Chrysogelos v. London, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 237, 250 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992) 
(“[O]ur courts have recognized that shareholders have no contractual right to receive takeover bids, 
and that the shareholders’ ability to gain premiums through takeover activity ‘is subject to the good 
faith business judgment of the board of directors in structuring defensive tactics.’”) (quoting Moran 
v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985), disapproved of on another 
point, Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004)). 
 201.  See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351, 1357 (Del. 1985) (holding poison 
pill plan validly adopted); EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW §141.2.6.6 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter FOLK ON DGCL] (summarizing cases 
denying orders for redemptions of pills). 
 202.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 925, 934 Table 3 (2002) (examining ninety-
two hostile takeover bids initiated and resolved between January 1996 and December 2000 and 
finding an 18.2% average nine-month shareholder return at companies that remained independent 
compared to a 54.5% return for the companies that were sold, and an average 25.0% thirty-month 
return for companies that remained independent compared to a 79.7% return at companies that were 
sold). 
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declaring dividends.203  Absent extraordinary circumstances, shareholders 
cannot compel the board to pay out the company’s cash to them.204  The 
board can pay no dividends if, in its judgment, husbanding the company’s 
cash for other purposes is better use of the money than paying it to 
shareholders205—as, for example, when the board decides to use the cash to 
finance efforts that may prove profitable in years to come, instead of making 
dividend payments to stockholders right now. 
The board also sets a public corporation’s business strategy, writ 
large.206  The board can force implementation of the strategy it selects 
because the board hires and fires top management.207  And the board, 
through its compensation committee, sets the pay for top officers, including 
the objectives that the officer must meet to receive incentive payments—
thus controlling company strategy, writ small.208 
Boards not only possess power; they exercise it.  For example, boards 
exercise their power to replace top executives.  One study of large company 
CEOs reports that, of 981 CEOs leaving between 1971 and 2006, seventeen 
percent departed because of pressure from the board.209  One scholar’s 
examination of firms suffering during the credit crisis purports to find that 
boards acted efficiently to remove top executives at companies that 
experienced financial distress during the 2008 market decline.210  Anecdotal 
 
 203.  See Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984). 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 170.7 (the “declaration of a dividend is ordinarily the 
sole prerogative of the board of directors”; “the mere fact that assets exist from which a dividend 
may be declared is insufficient” to justify a court order that a dividend be declared). 
 206.  CORPORATE LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. LAW SECTION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 
13 (6th ed. 2011) (stating that a board’s “principal responsibilities” include “provid[ing] general 
direction and guidance with respect to the corporation’s strategy”). 
 207.  Bylaws govern appointment of officers.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(e) (2011).  Bylaws 
routinely give the board the power to appoint the CEO.  See, e.g., AIG Bylaws, supra note 40, at Art. 
IV § 4.1 (“As soon as practicable after the annual meeting of stockholders in each year, the Board of 
Directors shall elect a Chief Executive Officer . . . .”); BofA Bylaws, supra note 86, at Art. VI § 2 
(“The officers of the Corporation shall be elected by the Board of Directors or by a committee or an 
officer authorized by the Board of Directors or a committee to elect one or more officers; provided, 
however, that no officer may be authorized to elect . . . the Chief Executive Officer . . . .”). 
  Bylaws can also govern the removal of the CEO.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b); see e.g., 
AIG Bylaws, supra note 40, at Art. IV § 4.2 (“The Board may remove any officer with or without 
cause at any time.”); BofA Bylaws, supra note 86, at Art. VI § 4 (“The Board of Directors, by the 
affirmative vote of a majority of its members, may remove . . . the Chief Executive Officer . . . 
whenever in its judgment the best interest of the Corporation would be served thereby.”). 
 208.  NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.05(b)(i)(A). 
 209.  Lucian A. Taylor, Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation, 65 J. 
OF FIN. 2051, 2065, Table II (2010). 
 210.  Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market 
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 37–40 (2009) (“Factiva searches for the 
thirty-seven companies removed from the S&P 500 during 2008 reveal publicized CEO turnover in 
nine firms, publicized senior (but non-CEO) executive turnover in eight, and turnover of both sorts 
01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:07 PM 
[Vol. 40: 533, 2013] Investors Should Know 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
565 
evidence also supports the notion that a key board role is to fire the CEO 
when it is in the interest of the company to do so.  The Hewlett-Packard  
board, which forced out Carly Fiorina,211 and the Merrill Lynch board, which 
forced out Stanley O’Neal,212 provide well-known examples. 
Moreover, studies show that the composition of a board, and its 
committees, affects a company in important ways.  Boards with greater 
accounting expertise—particularly boards that place directors with 
accounting expertise on their audit committees—provide better financial 
reporting.213  The speed with which a board discharges a CEO when a 
company underperforms its peers increases with director independence from 
management and increases with director ownership of stock.214  At least one 
study finds that CEO pay is lower, and firm value is higher, when a board 
includes a director who is independent of management and who either 
controls at least one percent of the equity voting power or owns at least one 
percent of the equity cash flow rights—with those correlations stronger if the 
 
in four companies . . . .  The . . . turnover . . . was not randomly distributed.  Instead, all but two of 
the companies involved were financials and the action focused almost exclusively on ‘at risk’ 
companies.  This is what would have been anticipated with well-functioning corporate 
governance . . . .”). 
 211.  See Gary Rivlin, Hewlett’s Board Forces Chief Out After Rocky Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2005, at A1; Pui-Wing Tam, Fallen Star: H-P’s Board Ousts Fiorina as CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 
2005, at A1 (detailing board-CEO discussions over several months that culminated in the firing). 
 212.  Graham Bowley & Jenny Anderson, Where Did the Buck Stop at Merrill?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2007, § 3 (Money and Business), at 1 (“Merrill’s board acted decisively immediately after 
the firm’s huge losses were disclosed and after it was further revealed that Mr. O’Neal had made an 
unauthorized merger approach to Wachovia. Within days, the board showed him the door . . . .”).  
While “[h]is ouster was being described as a retirement,” Landon Thomas, Jr., Merrill Chooses 
Insider To Lead Search for Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at C1, Mr. O’Neal testified later that 
“the Board asked me to retire shortly after we announced a large sub-prime related write-down in 
late 2007,” CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 184 (2008) (statement of E. Stanley O’Neal, former CEO of Merrill 
Lynch). 
 213.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the 
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 480 (2008) (summarizing “[e]xtensive research” 
showing “the correlation between various conceptions of audit committee expertise and related 
proxies for financial reporting quality (sometimes thought of as audit committee effectiveness)”). 
 214.  See Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. 
CORP. FIN. 257, 261 Table 269, Table 7, 270 (2008) (using data for percentage of unaffiliated and 
independent directors from 1996 to 2003 (9317 observations) and data for median dollar value of 
director stock ownership from 1998 to 2002 (6126 observations); finding that, considered together, 
“the dollar value of the median director’s stock ownership and the percentage of directors who are 
independent[]increase[] the probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms,” with 
poor performance measured by two years’ stock returns after controlling for industry returns, among 
other variables). 
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large shareholder sits on the board’s compensation committee.215 
In sum, because the law puts the board at the top of the corporation 
control pyramid, the party controlling board composition can dominate a 
company.  That domination affects everything from mergers and the quality 
of financial reports to the value of the company.  If the government controls 
the composition of a corporation’s board, the government may thus affect 
the enterprise profoundly. 
B.  The Recognition that Influence on Board Composition Is Material 
Federal securities laws regulate the revelation of “material” 
information.216  Information about a company is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the 
information important in deciding whether to buy or sell the securities of the 
company, taking into account the total mix of information available and 
relevant to that decision.217 
Existing disclosure rules reflect a judgment that changes in board 
composition—and the reasons for and identification of the parties behind 
such changes—are material and therefore should be disclosed.  When the 
Commission last adopted major changes in Form 8-K, the SEC stated that 
the facts companies must reveal in 8-K filings are “unquestionably or 
presumptively material” and therefore “must be disclosed currently.”218  As 
Part III.C.1 shows, those facts include director arrivals and departures, 
together with agreements by which directors join a board and disagreements 
causing directors to leave.219  The existing rules also recognize the 
importance of disclosing who is trying to add or remove directors, with 
Schedule 13D requiring disclosure by shareholders with more than five 
 
 215.  Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, 
Turnover and Firm Valuation 7, n.8, 8, 26 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished draft) (on file with author and 
available at http://bama.ua.edu/~aagrawal/IDB-CEO.pdf) (defining an IDB as “an independent 
director who is (or represents) a blockholder” with the voting power or financial interest set out in 
the text; using a sample of 11,547 firm-years over 1998–2006).  The study found, after controlling 
for other variables, that an individual or hedge fund IDB on a board is associated with lower CEO 
compensation, id. at 16–17,  an IDB presence correlates to a much higher probability of CEO 
turnover in the face of poor market-adjusted stock return, id. at 21–22, and IDB directors lead to a 
higher industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, id. at 22–23, a measure that the authors used for firm valuation, 
id. at 22.  The researchers concluded that “these effects are substantial and are generally larger when 
an IDB serves on the board’s compensation committee.”  Id. at 26. 
 216.  1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §3.4[2] (6th ed. 2009) (“The 
basic dividing line between what has to be disclosed and what information may be withheld is 
determined by the concept of materiality . . . .”). 
 217.  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 218.  Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 15,594, 15,595 (Mar. 25, 2004). 
 219.  See supra text accompanying notes 148–50, 154–55. 
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percent of a class of stock if the shareholders harbor “any plans” to change 
board composition.220  Such disclosures aim “to provide investors with 
notice of a possible change in management or the direction of a business as 
it ‘may affect their judgment as to whether the stock should be sold, 
bought[,] or held’”221—the very definition of materiality.  And existing rules 
acknowledge the importance of disclosing who “recommended” director 
candidates that the company nominates, with the proxy rules mandating 
identification of such recommenders.222  Indeed, when the SEC imposed the 
rule requiring disclosure of parties recommending candidates for the board, 
it rejected the argument that that information was not material.223 
Given the acknowledged importance of revealing director changes and 
who orchestrates those changes, it is especially strange that government 
influence should be shielded from disclosure.  The goal of a private market 
actor that is engineering a board change is almost certainly to change the 
company so that the return on the stock it holds will increase. But the 
government’s goal in controlling a board might be quite different.  For 
example, the government might be using corporate regime change to reduce 
the risk that a bank poses to the financial system, without regard to whether 
doing so will increase or even decrease expected returns to shareholders.  
Since the government could have such a vastly different purpose than a more 
traditional market actor, disclosure of the government’s role is especially 
important. 
C.  The Importance of Board Composition in Corporate Theory 
Not only is government influence over board composition practically 
important to investors, and not only is that influence material by security law 
standards, but government influence also implicates corporate theory.  The 
 
 220.  See supra text accompanying notes 128–29. 
 221.  Independence Fed. Sav. Bank v. Bender, 332 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1982)).  The purchaser of a more-
than-five-percent block must reveal plans to change the board “regardless of whether one of the 
purposes of the purchase is to acquire control of the issuer.”  Filing and Disclosure Requirements 
Relating to Beneficial Ownership, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,493 (Apr. 28, 1978)). 
 222.  See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 223.  Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between 
Security Holders and Boards of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204, 69,208 (Dec. 11, 2003)  (noting that 
the proposed rule “to identify the source of all director nominees” had drawn “extensive comment,” 
including the argument that it should not be imposed because “naming the specific source . . . would 
be immaterial,” but including the new requirement because the SEC “continue[d] to believe that 
information regarding the sources of company nominees is important for security holders.”). 
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three principal theories of the corporation all attribute importance to the 
board, and to the identity of those who control board membership.  This 
section summarizes the three theories in skeletal form, without the 
intricacies added by a legion of scholars.224  The purpose is not to evaluate 
the theories, much less to select one that is “best.”  This section aims only to 
show that influence by the government on board composition is a matter of 
extreme importance under each and every one of these theoretical 
constructs. 
1.  Shareholder Primacy Theory 
“Shareholder primacy” can describe corporations or serve as a 
normative rule for corporate operations.  As a descriptive theory, 
shareholder primacy posits that the shareholders “own” the business and 
elect directors who, in a sense, serve as the shareholders’ agents in running 
the corporation by, among other things, appointing the officers.225  The line 
of action starts with shareholders, then proceeds to the directors, and then to 
the officers. 
That description suggests the normative conclusion that a corporation 
should be run for the benefit of the shareholders, because they own it.226  
Shareholder primacy as a normative theory, however, is not tied exclusively 
to shareholder primacy as a descriptive device.227  Even some scholars who 
do not find it useful to describe corporate action as flowing from the owners 
(shareholders) to their agents (directors) to the employees (officers) still 
conclude that shareholder wealth maximization is the appropriate corporate 
goal for economic reasons.228  They argue, for example, that maximizing 
shareholder return minimizes the cost of capital and deters shirking by 
 
 224.  A more elaborate taxonomy would subdivide the categories in the text and find a larger 
number of analytically distinct theories.  Moreover, the theories to some extent blend into one 
another.  For my very limited purposes, however, the three-theory division is sufficient. 
 225.  See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992).  The directors are not the shareholders’ agents in a legal 
sense for a variety of reasons, including that the shareholders cannot control the directors’ actions 
after the shareholders elect the board.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006).  
However, the shareholder primacy model—as a descriptive construct—sees the directors as the 
shareholders’ economic agents. 
 226.  Allen, supra note 225, at 265 (under this analysis, “[t]he corporation’s purpose is to advance 
the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their wealth), and the function of directors, 
as agents of the owners, is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners”). 
 227.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“Although they are often used interchangeably, the terms ‘shareholder 
primacy’ and ‘shareholder wealth maximization’ in fact express distinct concepts.  The shareholder 
wealth maximization norm is a basic feature of U.S. corporate governance.”). 
 228.  Id. at 65–75. 
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executives and workers.229 
Corporate law reflects shareholder primacy theory to a significant 
degree.  Delaware law230 requires that shareholders elect directors.231 
Delaware also provides that shareholders can remove directors, even 
without cause.232  And Delaware closely guards the right of the shareholders 
to control board membership in these ways.  For example, the board itself 
cannot remove a director.233  Even a court’s power to do so is limited.234  
Absent exceptional circumstances, “[t]he only persons empowered to 
remove a director are the corporation’s shareholders.”235  As another 
example, Delaware employs a special rule to scrutinize companies that seek 
to defeat the shareholder franchise by thwarting a shareholder-led effort to 
change the board.236  If actions that in fact frustrate such a shareholder effort 
are undertaken “for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of 
stockholder voting power” to elect new directors, those actions only survive 
judicial review if the sitting board bears “the heavy burden of demonstrating 
a compelling justification.”237 
 
 229.  Since the shareholders only receive the cash from operations and sale of the company or its 
assets after the executives, employees, outside advisors, and creditors are paid, the shareholders are 
the ones with the incentive to ensure that all of the other actors function effectively.  Id. 
 230.  See supra note 196 (Delaware law predominant among large, publicly traded companies). 
 231.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011). 
 232.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011) (providing also that, if different classes or series 
elect different directors, only a vote of the shareholders who elected a particular director can remove 
that director). 
 233.  Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 251–52 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 884 A.2d 512 (Del. 2005) 
(“Section 141(k) of the DGCL states that directors may be removed with or without cause by a 
majority of the shares of the company.  [B]y negative implication intended by the draftsmen, 
directors do not have the authority to remove other directors.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., No. 17992, 2000 WL 1038190, at *11 n.30 (Del. 
Ch. July 21, 2000)); FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 141.5.4. 
 234.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225(c) (2011); Shocking Techs., Inc. v. Michael, C.A. No. 7164-
VCN, 2012 WL 1352431 at *1 & n.5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2012); Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, Civ. A. No. 
10378, 1993 WL 49778 at *17–18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993). 
 235.  Id. at *17 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011)).  The stockholders’ power to 
remove directors implements the normative principle of shareholder primacy.  See Bebchuk, 
Shareholder Franchise, supra note 33, at 682 (“[A] viable shareholder power to replace directors . . . 
is necessary to provide directors with strong affirmative incentives to focus on shareholder 
interests.”). 
 236.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 237.  Id. at 661.  While Blasius phrases its test so generally that it could apply to any effort to 
thwart shareholder voting, later cases largely limit it to instances in which the interference with 
shareholder voting affects director elections—confirming that the exceedingly difficult standard 
should be reserved for instances in which the action undermines the fundamental principle that 
shareholders control board composition.  See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 808–09 
(Del. Ch. 2007); In re The MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
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Delaware’s solicitude for shareholder power over board composition 
derives from the principle that the board rightly exercises power precisely 
because the corporation’s owners elect the board.  As one opinion puts it, 
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”238  Delaware accordingly 
“recognize[s] the transcending significance of the franchise to the claims to 
legitimacy of our scheme of corporate governance.”239 
As a descriptive construct, shareholder primacy relates simply and 
directly to government control of the board.  If the government owns shares 
with controlling voting power, as was true at AIG240—and if the company is 
properly described as a corporation—the government should control board 
composition.  As a normative matter, if the government is a shareholder, the 
company should be run for the financial benefit of the government (as well 
as the rest of the shareholders).241 
But where the government is not a voting shareholder, as was true at 
BofA,242 then shareholder primacy theory is unremittingly hostile to 
government power over director selection and retention.  If the government 
can come in from the side and disturb the clear vertical hierarchy running 
from the shareholders to their economic agents (the board) and to employees 
(the officers), then the description of the corporation as an entity controlled 
by the shareholders through election of the board is no longer accurate.  
Using shareholder primacy as a descriptive construct, a corporation whose 
board composition is determined to a significant degree by the government 
without shareholder votes is not a corporation at all. 
Normatively, government influence on director selection and 
retention—when the government does not exercise that control through its 
share ownership—threatens the very legitimacy of the board, which rests on 
the directors’ election by owners.  Government control threatens, as well, to 
turn the ends of the corporation from maximizing shareholder wealth to 
some other, politically determined, purpose.  That purpose might diminish 
the healthy influence that the focus on shareholder return produces on the 
efforts of other corporate participants. 
2.  Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theorists argue that shareholders are not “owners” of the 
corporation within the ordinary meaning of that word243 and that the 
 
 238.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 239.  Id. at 662. 
 240.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 241.  See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 242.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 243.  See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Governance: 
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directors are not “agents” of the shareholders.244  These theorists describe the 
corporation as a social actor that affects and is affected by a variety of 
constituencies—not only shareholders, but also employees, suppliers, 
customers, the communities in which the corporation does business and, in 
the view of some, the earth itself.245 
Beyond describing the corporation in this more diffuse way, stakeholder 
theory argues normatively that corporations should not seek solely to 
increase the wealth of shareholders.  Instead, the corporation should decide 
its actions after taking into account the effects on all constituencies—each of 
which has a moral claim on the corporation that goes beyond contract terms 
and beyond regulatory requirements.246  This broader normative focus 
derives, to some extent, from the simple notion that a corporation affecting 
multiple “constituencies” has the duty to treat each of them well.247  Some 
academics further justify a concern for non-shareholder constituencies on an 
 
Some Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine’s Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 66 (2007) (“The whole point 
of the corporate form is to make clear that shareholders are not owners—that their share ownership 
gives them no right to claim or exercise control over their pro rata share of the corporation’s assets 
or profits.”). 
 244.  Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 
754–55 (2007) (“Equally misleading is the similar myth that directors are ‘agents’ of shareholder 
‘principals.’”). 
 245.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1491 (1992) (“A classic question in the 
theory of corporate law is whether a corporation’s managers should ever exercise their discretion to 
further the interests of constituencies other than providers of capital. . . .  Corporate social 
responsibility [largely derived from stakeholder theory] may include attention to constituencies such 
as workers, communities, and consumers, and to goals such as preservation of the environment.”). 
 246.  See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 174–75 (2010) (“With the identity of the corporation organically 
shifting to accommodate its enhanced role in shaping markets and communities, ‘[c]orporate internal 
governance issues, once considered strictly economic and confined to internal corporate 
stakeholders, have been broadened to include . . . the concerns of outside stakeholders beyond the 
regulatory authority of the chartering state.’”) (quoting Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of 
Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the 
Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2008)); Julian Velasco, 
The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 454 (2006) (“To be a 
meaningful concept, [corporate] social responsibility [to stakeholders other than shareholders] must 
extend beyond legal requirements—and thus, by definition, cannot be legally enforceable.”). 
 247.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 814 (2005) 
(referring to one school of thought that “emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence derived from 
the state” that create “an implicit contract . . . that the corporation will help the state in mitigating 
harms that [the corporation] causes even in the absence of legal responsibility”).  And other scholars 
rest broad corporate moral obligations on the notion that parties affected by a business rely upon it.  
See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, 
in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 9, 10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
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economic basis.  One set of scholars, for example, characterizes business 
output as “team production,” with the team including participants other than 
shareholders and with the corporation able to flourish economically only if it 
honors obligations to other team members by taking actions beyond those to 
which the company is legally bound.248 
Some aspects of current corporate law reflect stakeholder theory.  
Delaware decisions allow target boards to consider non-shareholder 
“constituencies” when making decisions on takeover proposals, at least 
when the target is not simply selling itself to the highest bidder.249  Even 
more strikingly, many state corporate statutes—largely in response to hostile 
takeovers in the 1980s—contain provisions that expressly permit (and in a 
few instances require) boards to consider constituencies other than 
shareholders when making business decisions.250 
The theory and law embodying stakeholder theory’s normative 
component, however, quickly encounters a central problem.  With many 
different “stakeholders,” the interests of some may conflict with the interests 
of others, and, if the corporation really owes moral duties to different 
constituencies (or duties which must be faithfully discharged in order to 
produce desirable economic results), the business will at times have to make 
tough choices between stakeholders.251  For example, a company may have 
to determine the extent to which it should forego shareholder returns in order 
to keep its employment numbers high and thereby benefit its labor force.  As 
 
 248.  The “team production” theorists see participants in a business enterprise (shareholders, 
creditors, employees, management) as making firm-specific investments of labor or capital—
difficult or impossible to retrieve at a value equal to the initial cost—and together creating a product 
or service that is hard to conceptually disassemble in order to attribute portions of its value to 
different participants.  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249, 276 (1999).  These theorists therefore argue that, beyond contract, the 
participants enter into a pact to resolve disputes through a designated hierarchy that “can be viewed 
as a substitute for explicit contracting . . . .”  Id. at 278; see also id. at 319–20.  The job of the 
hierarchy—with the board sitting at the top—is to serve the team as a whole by “control[ling] 
shirking and rent-seeking” by the different members and to “balance team members’ competing 
interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.”  
Id. at 280–81. 
 249.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (permitting a board, in 
analyzing the threat posed by a takeover bid, to consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”).  
But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(limiting consideration of other constituencies to instances in which “there are rationally related 
benefits accruing to the stockholders” and prohibiting such consideration altogether when a board is 
auctioning the company). 
 250.  Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old 
Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 BUS. LAW. 1369, 1371 n.3 (2005). 
 251.  See Millon, supra note 247, at 14 (“In the situations that communitarians are concerned 
about, the interests of particular non-shareholder constituencies conflict with those of shareholders, 
and there may well be conflicts among the interests of different nonshareholder constituencies as 
well.”). 
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another example, a company owning a plant that operates legally, but 
unfortunately degrades the air quality in the surrounding community, might 
have to choose between shutting down that plant (thereby benefiting the 
community at the expense of both shareholders and the laborers employed at 
the plant) or continuing to operate the plant (thereby imposing 
environmental costs on the community while saving the jobs of those who 
work at the facility and making more money for the shareholders). 
Some central corporate body must aggregate the interests of the 
different stakeholders and mediate trade-offs between them.252  Not 
surprisingly, stakeholder theorists have selected the board of directors, 
occupying the top spot in the corporate hierarchy, to play this key role.253  
Clearly, then, if the government controls or influences board composition, 
the government can affect the trade-offs between stakeholders, perhaps even 
wildly shifting the company’s priorities. 
3.  Nexus of Contracts Theory 
Yet a third theory describes the corporation as a network of contractual 
relationships.254  This description posits that the company is “an aggregate of 
various inputs acting together to produce goods or services,”255 with “explicit 
and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various 
inputs.”256  The contracts define shareholder rights against the board and 
board rights against management—rights set out in the articles of 
incorporation and the corporate law of the state in which the company is 
organized.257  The contracts include, as well, the debt agreements that define 
 
 252.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 248, at 278. 
 253.  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of 
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 435 (2001) (“Just as directors are free to listen (if not 
always to respond) to the shareholders’ wishes, they are free to listen (if not always to respond) to 
the wishes of creditors, top executives, and rank and file employees.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social 
Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There 
Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2002) (noting the view that “the board acts as 
a ‘mediating hierarch’ that balances the respective interests”); see also Allen, supra note 225, at 271 
(“Resolving the often conflicting claims of [the] various corporate constituencies calls for judgment, 
indeed calls for wisdom, by the board of directors . . . .”). 
 254.  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 227, at 28–30. 
 255.  Id. at 28. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  See FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 102.16 (“A certificate of incorporation is a contract 
among the stockholders of the corporation” with “[t]he contract rights of the stockholders of the 
corporation . . . also subject to the provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”).  Even the 
law itself is a matter of contract in an important sense.  The organizers of a business choose its form 
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the rights of those who loan money to the company, and employment 
agreements with executives and with the non-management labor force.258 
Some individual or group must coordinate all the contracts so that the 
corporation operates in some reasonably purposeful way.259  That 
coordinator—the “nexus” of the network of contracts—is, by at least one 
prominent theorist, the board of directors.260  Indeed, that same theorist, 
relying in part on the description of the modern corporation as an 
interconnected set of contracts, argues that public companies today display 
not shareholder primacy but “director primacy,”261 claiming that “to the 
limited extent . . . the corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is 
the board of directors that personifies the corporate entity.”262 
While this analysis has not influenced the law as directly as shareholder 
primacy and stakeholder theory, the nexus of contracts construct is well 
recognized among corporate scholars263 and puts the board at the center of 
the web of relationships constituting the company.264  The identity of board 
members and those who select directors arguably ranks at the top of all 
corporate concerns for anyone who embraces this theory—certainly for 
those who conclude that corporations today display “director primacy.” 
Thus, this third theory, too, highlights the importance of government 
influence over director selection.  If the government controls the board, it 
controls the nexus of the contracts.  Such control could affect any or all of 
the principal contracts constituting the corporation and could pull the entire 
web of contracts in one direction or another. 
 
(e.g., “as a corporation, trust, partnership, mutual, or cooperative”).  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991).  They choose the 
state in which to incorporate, with that state’s law thereafter governing the “internal affairs” of the 
company, including “the powers and obligations of a corporation’s managers vis-à-vis the 
corporation and its shareholders, and the rights and duties of the . . . shareholders vis-à-vis the 
corporation, its management and the other shareholders . . . .”  FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, 
CORPORATION LAW §§ 1.2, 1.2.1 (2d ed. 2010). 
 258.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 553 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. 
 259.  Id. at 556. 
 260.  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 227, at 33–34 (citations omitted): 
[T]he defining characteristic of a corporation is the existence of a central decision maker 
vested with the power of fiat—i.e., a central coordinator that is a party to the set of 
contracts we call the firm and that has the power to effect adaptive responses to changed 
conditions by fiat. 
  If the corporation has such a nexus, where is it located?  The Delaware code, like the 
corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer: the corporation’s “business 
and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.”  Put 
simply, the board is the corporate nexus of contracts. 
 261.  Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 258, at 550. 
 262.  Id. at 560. 
 263.  See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 
109 (3d ed. 2009). 
 264.  See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 258, at 550. 
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D.  A Response to Critics 
As the previous sections show, government control over board 
membership is important from a number of different perspectives.  Two 
strains of academic thought, however, argue against any urgency in bringing 
government influence on public company board membership out of the 
darkness and into the light.265 
The first concludes that boards—despite their legal authority and their 
effect on some important business matters—have little impact on most 
companies’ business most of the time.266  This view suggests that the identity 
of directors—and those who select the directors—is of so little importance 
that the disclosure of currently cloaked government efforts to change boards 
is not worth the cost such disclosure would impose.267  The second strain 
argues that shareholders inevitably have scant influence on board 
membership.268  This school of thought implies that “protecting” the 
shareholder franchise by revealing how government influence supplants it, 
or simply revealing government influence because it deviates from the norm 
of shareholder control over director selection, protects a mere chimera or 
reveals a departure from a formal but empty protocol.269  Neither school of 
thought should deflect us from the reform this Article advocates. 
1.  The Argument That Most Boards Are Mostly Unimportant 
Some scholars contend that, although state law nominally places the 
board of directors at the top of the corporation, and although the financial 
press has published the extraordinary actions of a handful of boards, the 
boards of most publicly traded corporations are overwhelmingly passive, 
and, hence, unimportant.  Board passivity, these academics posit, derives 
from a host of factors.  Boards fail to effectively monitor executive 
performance in part because the boards themselves selected the executives, 
and boards fail to skeptically evaluate the results of corporate strategy 
because the boards in one way or another approved those strategies before or 
while the executives implemented them.270  Ironically, this debility increases 
 
 265.  See infra Parts IV.D.1–2. 
 266.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 70 (2008). 
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as boards become more deeply involved in strategy and executive hiring.271  
The greater their involvement, the greater the directors’ personal 
commitment to any strategic or hiring decision and, therefore, the more 
difficulty the board experiences in critically evaluating that decision.272 
In addition to this inherent weakness, boards are often “captured” by top 
executives because top executives are inevitably involved in the selection of 
new directors and the recommendation for re-nomination of sitting board 
members, and the directors, well knowing this to be the case, are reluctant to 
criticize their patrons.273  Further, management’s control over the agenda of 
board meetings, and over the information that the board considers as it 
attends to that agenda, weakens the board as a source of independent 
power.274  The need for speedy board decisions on such matters as mergers 
and acquisitions—after executives dump data on directors—aggravates this 
initiative/information disparity.275  So do social norms of collegiality, which 
discourage aggressive questions and frank criticism by board members of 
management plans and results.276  And, of course, those board members who 
are not officers are part-time participants in the corporation, inherently at a 
disadvantage as compared with management in influencing company action, 
because management works at the company full time.277 
 
 271.  See id. at 63 (“Boards cannot be expected to be more objective in their evaluations of senior 
management at the same time that they are being required to become increasingly involved with 
senior management in the decisions about strategy . . . .”). 
 272.  See id. 
 273.  Id. at 93–95. 
 274.  See MACEY, supra note 270, at 83 (“Generally speaking, management’s control of the flow 
of information to the board . . . creates a dynamic in which management is able to capture its 
board . . . by controlling the nature of the information available to directors when making 
decisions.”).  “Boards . . . lack both the inclination and the capacity to generate information for 
themselves through a process that is independent of management.”  Id. at 94.  “The asymmetry of 
information . . . [between management and a board] has long been recognized as an impediment to 
the ability of boards . . . to monitor management effectively.”  Id. at 96. 
 275.  See id. at 60–61 (“Directors who challenge management’s recommendations or who simply 
demand more information risk being . . . accused of impeding the company’s ability to respond to 
new opportunities efficiently.”). 
 276.  Id. at 61–62. 
[D]irectors are supposed to be ‘team players’ who ‘get along’ with senior executives and 
their fellow directors, and perform their duties in an atmosphere of comfortable 
collegiality. 
. . . . 
Where a CEO makes a proposal to a group of board members, the first board member to 
raise questions or to disagree with management bears the greatest risk of being branded 
uncooperative or non-collegial. With this in mind . . . he has an incentive to remain 
quiet . . . . 
Id. 
 277. George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy 
Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1242 (2008) (“Most boards meet about 
once a month, too little time to match the managers’ knowledge about the firm.”); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
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If all of these considerations mean that boards are fundamentally 
unimportant—as a matter of fact rather than theory and corporate statutes—
then the identity of those who influence the composition of boards is also of 
little moment.  In that case, there is no pressing need to override whatever 
considerations counsel against disclosure of government influence on the 
selection and retention of directors. 
One powerful answer is that society has made a very determined effort 
in the last two decades to address the problems just identified in order to 
increase the power of boards, particularly in relation to top management.  In 
1999, all three major domestic trading platforms adopted rules effectively 
requiring public company boards to have audit committees and requiring 
that the audit committees—rather than management—possess ultimate 
authority over the hiring, evaluation, and replacement of the outside 
auditor.278  After the Enron and WorldCom debacles, Congress, through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, put this requirement into law.279 
The scandals also prompted the exchanges, particularly the New York 
Stock Exchange, to radically revise listing standards to invigorate boards of 
directors in other ways.280  Today, those listing standards require that a 
majority of directors serving on each public company board be 
“independent,”281 precisely so that the board can “exercise independent 
judgment in carrying out [its] responsibilities.”282  To increase the 
probability that this majority will vigorously monitor management and 
substantively contribute to corporate actions, the listing standards—in 
 
247, 254 (2008). 
 278.  Order Approving Proposed Change in NASDAQ Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 71,523, 71,524–25 (Dec. 14, 1999); Order Approving Proposed Change in American Stock 
Exchange Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,518, 71,519 (Dec. 14, 1999); Order 
Approving Proposed Change in New York Stock Exchange Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 71,529, 71,529–30 (Dec. 14, 1999). 
 279.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  The new law required 
the SEC to issue regulations requiring the exchanges to decline to list securities unless an issuer’s 
audit committee is “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the 
work of [the auditor] . . . (including resolution of disagreements between management and the 
auditor regarding financial reporting)” and unless the auditor reports “directly to the audit 
committee.”  Id. § 301; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m)(1)(A), 78j-1(m)(2) (2006).  See the resulting 
regulation, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(a)(1), 240.10A-3(b)(2) (2012), and the listing standards 
requiring compliance with the regulation, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 
303A.06; NASDAQ, INC., STOCK MARKET RULE 5605(c)(3), available at 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/. 
 280.  See generally Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance 
at NYSE and NASDAQ Listed Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
 281.  NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.01. 
 282.  Id. § 303A.01 cmt. 
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addition to imposing a general test for independence—exclude from 
“independent” directors those who have specified relationships that might 
cause them to unduly favor management.283  For example, a director is not 
independent if he or she receives “more than $120,000 in direct 
compensation from the . . . company” “during any twelve-month period”—
compensation that management could control and use to influence the 
director’s action in the boardroom.284  In order to “empower non-
management directors to serve as a more effective check” on executives, the 
NYSE listing standards also mandate that “the non-management directors of 
each listed company meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions,” 
without company officers present.285 
In a further effort to increase independent decision making by directors, 
the NYSE requires that each listed company’s board have, in addition to an 
audit committee, both a nominating/corporate governance committee and a 
compensation committee.286  All of the directors serving on these three key 
committees must satisfy the new “independence” definition.287  And the 
NYSE standards include lists of specific tasks that these three committees 
must undertake in order to ensure that they actually perform their work.288 
The independent directors on the nominating committee, for example, 
are charged with “identify[ing] individuals qualified to become board 
members, consistent with criteria approved by the board, and . . . select[ing], 
or . . . recommend[ing] that the board select, the director nominees for the 
next annual meeting of shareholders.”289  At least formally, this takes 
director selection out of management’s hands and thereby removes the 
influence that the top executive can exercise over directors by controlling 
their tenure on the board.  To ensure that the nominating committee can 
control the search for director candidates, the commentary to the NYSE 
listing standards states that “the charter [for each such committee] should 
give [that] committee sole authority to retain and terminate any search firm 
to be used to identify director candidates, including sole authority to approve 
the search firm’s fees and other retention terms.”290 
Similarly, by federal law, the listing standards now require express 
 
 283.  Id. § 303A.02. 
 284.  Id. § 303A.02(b)(ii). 
 285.  Id. § 303A.03. 
 286.  Id. §§ 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.06. 
 287.  Id. §§ 303A.04(a), 303A.05, 303A.07(a). 
 288.  The standards impose the committees’ duties by requiring that each committee have a 
written charter addressing specific duties and responsibilities that the standards lay out.  For 
example, the standards set out eight specific duties for the audit committee.  Id. § 303A.07(b)(iii); 
see also id. § 303A.04(b)(i) (tasks for the nominating/corporate governance committee); id. § 
303A.05(b)(i) (tasks for the compensation committee). 
 289.  Id. § 303A.04(b)(i). 
 290.  Id. § 303A.04 cmt. 
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authority for each audit committee “to engage independent counsel and other 
advisors, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties” and require each 
public company to pay for any advisor that the audit committee hires.291  The 
recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act requires that compensation 
committees have similar power to hire advisors.292 
All of these laws, regulations, and listing standards reflect society’s 
determination that boards should—and can—serve as an independent force 
at the top of the corporate hierarchy.  Instead of giving up on boards as have 
some academics, society has by these reforms doubled down on directors.  
This is, accordingly, not the time to conclude that boards are so unimportant 
that the general thrust of federal securities law—disclosure—should be 
ignored when the government actively attempts to control board 
membership. 
2.  The Argument that Shareholder Election of Boards Accomplishes 
Naught 
As set out above, prevalent state law prescribes that the shareholders 
elect and remove directors.293  The notion that we need disclosure when 
government influence on board composition displaces shareholder control 
over board membership implies that shareholder control over director 
selection and retention is “ordinary,” or “better,” or “more legitimate,” in 
some sense, than government control.294  That implication, in turn, rests on a 
notion that shareholders exercise their franchise to elect boards in a 
meaningful way. 
For years, however, academics have argued that the shareholders of 
widely held public corporations do not care about who the directors are and 
that, even if the shareholders care in some abstract sense, they do not, in 
practice, evaluate director candidates carefully.  By this view, shareholders 
are “rationally apathetic” in part due to collective-action problems; it simply 
does not pay for one shareholder, holding a sliver percentage of total shares, 
to spend the resources to change a board,295 or even in many instances to 
 
 291.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m)(5), 78j-1(m)(6) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(b)(4), 240.10A-
3(b)(5)(ii) (2012). 
 292.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010 & Supp. V 2011), § 952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-3(c)–(e) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 293.  See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 294.  See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 295.  Consider an investor who holds one million shares of a company with one billion shares 
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gather information to decide how to vote in director elections.296  Rational 
apathy affects even institutional investors, such as mutual funds, since they 
often diversify their holdings among many different portfolio companies, 
owning only a small proportion of the stock issued by any one of them.297 
Even if shareholders were sufficiently motivated to seek information 
about director candidates, shareholders in the main (so the argument goes) 
simply can never obtain the facts they need to make intelligent choices.298  
And if shareholders—one by one—could somehow get hold of and analyze 
relevant information, they would risk securities law violations—absent 
expensive compliance with complicated securities rules—if they ran their 
own director candidates and solicited proxies for that dissident slate.299 
To top it off, most director elections are uncontested,300 with only the 
candidates nominated by the sitting board running,301 so that the shareholders 
do not really have a choice anyway.  And plurality voting—the default 
voting protocol under state statutes302—ensures that in uncontested elections 
a director candidate receiving even one vote in his or her favor will win a 
seat on the board, even if all the other votes are “withheld” in protest.303 
 
outstanding.  Suppose that investor could, by spending $1,000,000, elect a new board and that the 
new board’s actions would raise the stock price by seventy-five cents a share.  Shareholders overall 
would enjoy a huge gain—$750,000,000.  But the investor who went to the trouble of organizing 
and funding the campaign for board change would see an increase of only $750,000 in his 
shareholdings, thereby suffering a net $250,000 loss on the effort.  See Dent, supra note 277, at 
1253. 
 296.  MACEY, supra note 270, at 203. 
 297.  Id. at 199–200. 
 298.  A sophisticated version of this argument contends that companies will never disclose all 
pertinent information, and therefore shareholders will never have all such information.  Therefore, as 
ill-informed shareholders acquire power at the expense of better-informed management, the 
probability that a company will be operated in a way that optimizes its fundamental value—as 
opposed to its stock price—declines.  See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case 
Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010). 
 299.  If “two or more [shareholders] agree to act together for the purpose of . . . voting . . . equity 
securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial 
ownership . . . of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by any such persons.”  17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2012).  Such a group collectively owning more than ten percent of a class 
of equity securities is subject to the reporting requirements in section 16(a) of the Exchange Act.  15 
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(1) (2012).  Such a group 
purchasing more than five percent of such a class of securities is subject to the reporting 
requirements in section 13(d).  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1).  If such 
a group “solicits” proxies for voting in director elections, then, with some exceptions, that group 
must comply with the proxy solicitation law and regulations.  15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14a-15 (2012). 
 300.  See Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 33, at 682–83 (finding only about thirty 
contested elections per year during 1996 through 2005). 
 301.  See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.04. 
 302.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2011). 
 303.  William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 
40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2007); Vincent Falcone, Note, Majority Voting in Director 
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Vast changes—both in the investing industry and, very determinedly, in 
the rules and regulations that govern that industry—have attacked virtually 
all these problems over the last several decades.  On the industry side, 
activist hedge funds have acquired stockholdings in a fair number of 
publicly traded companies.304  Those funds seek to change the companies’ 
businesses—in many cases by threatening a proxy fight for board seats and 
in some cases by carrying out that threat.305  The hedge funds overcome the 
collective-action problem in part simply by owning a sufficient stake to 
make their efforts worthwhile to them, and, in part, by a “wolf pack” 
effect—with one activist hedge fund leading the attack and other such funds 
then buying stock in the attacked public company and supporting the 
initiating aggressor.306  And, once an activist hedge fund launches an attack 
on a management and an incumbent board, traditional institutional investors 
such as mutual funds sometimes join the fight.307  The companies that the 
funds assault generally improve their performance.308  All of this works 
because the shareholders are employing, or threatening to employ, their 
franchise. 
Institutional investors’ reliance on professional proxy advisors, who 
gather information on director candidates and other matters on which 
shareholders vote, also reduces collective-action problems by effectively 
spreading the cost of acquiring information among the proxy advisor’s many 
clients.309  Those advisors reduce costs still more by shouldering the 
 
Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift Solution?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 844 (2007). 
 304.  See generally William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. L.J. 
1375 (2007). 
 305.  See id. at 1401–05, Table IV (finding 130 domestic companies attacked by hedge fund 
between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2006, at 1385, and describing typical hedge fund tactics, 
including 60 cases in which the hedge fund initiated a proxy contest); see also Marcel Kahan & 
Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998–1001 (2010). 
 306.  Bratton, supra note 304, at 1403. 
 307.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 1003–05. 
 308.  Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 
J. FIN. 1729, 1730–31, 1739 (2008) (examining hedge fund activism against 882 target companies 
from the beginning of 2001 through the end of 2006; finding “large positive average abnormal 
[target company stock price] returns, in the range of 7% to 8%, during the (–20,+20) announcement 
window,” with “the positive returns at announcement . . . not reversed over time, as there is no 
evidence of a negative abnormal drift during the 1-year period subsequent to the announcement” and 
“[t]he positive market reaction . . . also consistent with ex post evidence of overall improved 
performance at target firms”). 
 309.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 1005–07. 
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mechanical burden of casting institutional investors’ votes in corporate 
elections.310 
To address the issues created by plurality voting, shareholder advocates, 
including institutional investors, have urged boards to adopt “majority 
voting” rules.311  Those rules prevent seating a director who, when running 
unopposed, fails to receive “for” votes from a majority of shares cast on his 
or her candidacy.312  Beginning in earnest in 2004 with about a dozen 
shareholder proposals for such voting,313 the majority-voting protocol, in one 
form or another, governed director elections at nearly eighty percent of 
Standard & Poor’s 500 companies by 2012.314 
To address the difficulty created by elections offering shareholders only 
candidates selected by the incumbent board, the SEC twice (in 1978 and 
2003) adopted regulations to facilitate shareholder suggestions to 
nominating committees.315  Much more aggressively, the SEC in 2003 
proposed, but did not adopt, a regulation requiring each public company to 
include in its proxy statements and on its proxy forms the names of 
candidates nominated by a shareholder, or a group of shareholders.316  The 
SEC proposed another version of such a rule in 2009,317 and adopted that 
regulation, with further revisions, in 2010,318 after Congress explicitly 
granted the Commission the authority to issue such a proxy access rule.319  
While the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC regulation in 2011 on the ground 
that the Commission had not adequately apprised itself of costs and 
 
 310.  Id. at 1005. 
 311.  See Falcone, supra note 303, at 853–56. 
 312.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 856. 
 313.  Id. at 854–55. 
 314.  Holly J. Gregory, Trends in Director Elections: Key Results from the 2012 Proxy Season, 
PRACTICAL LAW THE JOURNAL 20, 20 (2012) (“According to data from Alliance Advisors (using 
FactSet and company filings), about 80% of S&P 500 companies have since adopted some form of 
majority voting . . . .”) . 
 315.  Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process 
and Corporate Governance Generally, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522, 58,527, 58,831 (Dec. 14, 1978) (adding 
then Item 6(d) to Schedule 14A, which, in 6(d)(2), required that a company seeking proxies for 
election of directors disclose whether its nominating committee would consider candidates suggested 
by shareholders, and, if so, the procedure that shareholders should follow to make suggestions); 
Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Security 
Holders and Boards of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204, 69,221 (Dec. 11, 2003) (revising 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-101 Schedule 14A Item 7(d) (2012), which now cross-references 17 C.F.R. 229.407(c)(2), 
with subparts (ii) and (iii) requiring a company to describe its nominating committee’s policy 
regarding nominees recommended by shareholders and to state, if it does not have a policy, why the 
company believes it is appropriate not to have one). 
 316.  Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
 317.  Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009). 
 318.  Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
 319.  Dodd-Frank, supra note 292, § 971 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. V 2011). 
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benefits,320 the persistent effort to give shareholders access to the company’s 
proxy solicitation machinery in order to provide alternatives to the 
candidates nominated by the sitting board reflects a continuing commitment 
to ensure that the shareholders have a meaningful role, rather than only a 
formal role, in selecting corporate directors. 
The SEC has also acted to require that mutual funds cast their votes in 
director elections in a thoughtful way.  As the owner of the stock in its 
portfolio companies, a mutual fund has the right to vote that stock in the 
director elections at those companies.321  Specifically to “encourage funds to 
become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their 
portfolios,”322 the SEC adopted in 2003 rules that (i) require the investment 
advisors running the funds to adopt and implement “written policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the advisor[s] 
vote[]”portfolio company shares “in the best interest of” the funds323 and (ii) 
require the funds to disclose how they vote in corporate elections.324 
This Article’s purposes do not include arguing that these regulatory 
reforms significantly increase shareholder power in most board elections, or 
that shareholder votes in director elections regularly and significantly affect 
corporate policy.325  But these reforms aim directly at the very factors that 
observers say prevent shareholders from effectively exercising their voting 
 
 320.  Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 321.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Practices and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,564, 6,564–65 (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Proxy 
Voting Disclosure]. 
 322.  Id. at 6566. 
 323.  Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,585, 6,586, 6,593 (now providing, at 
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–6(a), that it is a “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice or 
course of business” under the Investment Advisors Act to exercise voting authority for a fund 
without adopting and implementing such policies and procedures). 
 324.  Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Disclosure, supra note 321, at 6,581–85 (requiring funds to 
disclose their votes in an SEC filing available to the public via the Commission’s database and 
revising various forms to mandate that mutual funds advise their shareholders that they can obtain 
fund voting records by accessing the SEC database or by requesting information from the fund or, if 
the fund posts its voting record on its website, by visiting the fund website); see also 17 C.F.R. § 
270.30b1-4 (2012); SEC, Form N-1A, at Item 27(d)(5) (2010); SEC, Annual Report of Proxy Voting 
Record of Registered Management Investment Company (Form N-PX) (2003). 
 325.  Recent research shows that shareholder voting can affect company policy even in 
uncontested elections.  Cai et al., supra note 99, at 2410, 2417 (finding that “a 1% decrease in the 
average vote for a compensation committee member reduces unexplained [positive] CEO 
compensation by $143,000 in the next year” and that “a 1% decrease in the compensation committee 
chair votes is associated with a reduction in unexplained [positive] CEO compensation by 
approximately $220,000 in the following year,” with “unexplained CEO compensation” being the 
compensation that cannot be predicted by such factors as industry and recent stock returns). 
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rights.  And the reforms have continued into very recent years.  The reforms 
therefore manifest a continuing societal commitment to shareholder power—
including, particularly, shareholder power to elect directors.  That 
commitment—together with the emergence of activist hedge funds that 
have, at least in some number of cases, achieved corporate change through 
the threat of shareholder votes in director elections326—weakens any 
argument that it is unnecessary or unimportant to know whether government, 
instead of shareholders, controls board composition because shareholder 
control is either illusory or irrational.  It would be passing strange to make 
all these efforts to realize shareholder control over board composition, then 
deliberately forego shedding light on active interference with that control by 
the government—particularly in cases like BofA, where the government 
does not exercise such control through any shareholder voting rights that it 
holds.327 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO CLOSE THE HOLES 
Disclosure of government attempts to influence the composition of a 
public company’s board in a securities filing available on the SEC’s website 
solves all the problems set out above.  It provides prompt, material 
information about government influence.  It permits shareholders to consider 
what that influence portends for company strategy.  It lets all of us consider 
whether government influence is consistent with our notion of what a 
corporation is and what purposes it should serve. 
This Article therefore proposes a new SEC reporting requirement aimed 
specifically at government efforts to change a public company’s board 
membership, a requirement to file a new Form GIB (“Government Influence 
on Board”), which when submitted would be immediately available on the 
database that the SEC maintains for public access.  Such a proposal raises 
five questions, addressed in the subparts that follow: (1) What should a 
Form GIB disclose?;328 (2) When should the Form be filed?;329 (3) Who 
should file the Form?;330 (4) Should the filing requirement include an 
exception applying when the government determines that disclosure is likely 
to produce significant harm?;331 and (5) Do we really need to require 
 
 326.  See Bratton, supra note 304, at 1405–06 (documenting a high proportion of instances in 
sample in which activist funds in hostile engagements with targets obtained concessions, including 
“board membership (40% of the hostile targets), sale or liquidation of the target (28%), and the sale 
or the sale or spin off of a division (21%)”). 
 327.  See supra Part II.B. 
 328.  See infra Part V.A. 
 329.  See infra Part V.B. 
 330.  See infra Part V.C. 
 331.  See infra Part V.D. 
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disclosure by creating the new Form GIB, or can we simply rely on 
companies and the government to tell us when the government tries to 
change a board?332 
A.  What to Disclose 
Clearly, disclosure should include the fact of government influence, 
identify the communication through which the government exercised its 
influence, and provide the date of the communication.  But the report should 
identify the participants in the communication as well—the name and title of 
the government official and the name and title of the company participant.333  
The more highly placed the government participant, or the more power the 
official has over the company as a result of his or her position, the greater 
the pressure will be.  The more influential the company participant, the more 
likely the pressure will be communicated to those in the company who 
matter—who could encourage sitting directors to leave the board or affect 
the selection of new directors between shareholder meetings, or control 
nominations at future shareholder meetings. 
The report should include the substance of the communication—what 
was said.  That substance includes the board change that the government 
requests, suggests, demands, or recommends, set out in the same detail as in 
the communication itself.  If the government includes a time frame in which 
it wishes or demands or recommends the change occur, the report should 
include that, too.  The extent and the schedule of the government’s desired 
change constitute, by definition, the influence that the government seeks to 
exert.  If the government states that unless the company makes the change, 
the government will take some action against the company or withhold some 
benefit from the company, the Form GIB should include those statements.  
That part of the communication identifies the power that the government is 
using to effectuate the change and affects the likelihood that the company 
will make the change the government wants. 
The report, relatedly, should include the form of the communication.  
 
 332.  See infra Part V.E. 
 333.  The securities law in other areas requires accounts of particular conversations or meetings.  
For example, a company seeking proxies from shareholders to approve a merger must describe past 
contacts and negotiations leading to the proposed deal.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Schedule 14A, 
Item 14(b)(7) (2012) (cross-referencing 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1005(b)–229.1005(c)).  See the 
descriptions of two conversations between Ken Lewis and John Thain on September 13, 2008 
included in the proxy solicitation to shareholders of BofA and Merrill Lynch in connection with the 
merger of those two companies.  Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 49 (Nov. 
3, 2008). 
01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:07 PM 
 
586 
The form of the suggestion, recommendation, or demand affects the power 
behind it.334  In the BofA case, the fact that the government sought a board 
change through a bank regulatory enforcement mechanism (the MOU) put 
special force behind the government’s stated desire.335 
The report should include the reason or purpose for the government’s 
request, suggestion, demand, or recommendation to the extent that the 
communication revealed that reason or purpose.  Particularly in the case of a 
bank in which the government does not have a significant equity interest and 
therefore does not have a simple profit motive—and in light of the fact that 
bank regulatory authorities can issue an MOU whether or not the 
government owns an equity interest in a bank or its holding company—the 
reason for the government’s effort to change the board may be unclear.  That 
is, even where the government has a well-defined reason for intervening in 
the affairs of a financial institution (e.g., to prevent the bank from engaging 
in unsound practices consisting of particular kinds of transactions), 
identification of that reason may not explain why the government is seeking 
to change the board as opposed to, for example, simply forbidding the bank 
from entering into the kind of transaction that the government deems 
unsound.  The government might want a board change because it concludes 
that the board cannot adequately monitor the executives at a company, or 
because the government believes that the board needs greater expertise in 
some area such as risk analysis and control.336  Whatever the expressed 
reason, the Form GIB should reveal it. 
B.  When to Disclose 
We should require disclosure only of serious government efforts to 
change a public company board.  A casual comment by one government 
official to another—no matter how lofty their positions on an organization 
chart—should not trigger a filing, for such a trigger would inhibit discussion 
among officials.  Nor should an out-loud rumination by a midlevel 
government worker to a company officer or employee of modest authority 
 
 334.  Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79, at C1 (reporting that BofA was operating under a secret 
regulatory sanction that required it to overhaul its board and “address perceived problems with risk 
and liquidity management”). 
 335.  Id. (“The MOU is the most serious procedural action taken against Bank of America by 
federal regulators since the financial crisis erupted.”); see supra Part II.B.2. 
 336.  The securities laws and regulations are no strangers to a requirement that filers state their 
purpose.  A purchaser of more than five percent of a class of a public company’s equity securities 
must file a Schedule 13D that, among other things, must state the “purpose of the purchase or 
prospective purchases,” including “any plans or proposals” for an extraordinary corporate 
transaction such as a merger, a sale of a material amount of the company’s assets, or “any other 
major change in [the issuer’s] business or corporate structure.”  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (2006); 17 
C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(a), 240.13d-101 Items 4, 4(b), (c), (f) (2012). 
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prompt a report.  Such talk is so unlikely to change board membership that 
reporting it would needlessly clutter the information landscape.337 
The effort to define a disclosure trigger could proceed by considering a 
wide continuum of government-company contacts, all varying by 
participants and substance.  Such an analysis could produce a multifactor 
test that would determine when to require disclosure of government 
pressure.  The law, securities law in particular, includes such tests.338  But 
multiple criteria of this sort are hard to apply, and while securities law 
sometimes employs deliberately general rules,339 the SEC often opts for 
bright lines.340  This Article favors a clear and easily applied test, in part 
because it will facilitate compliance and lower cost by minimizing counsel 
hours spent mulling multiple factors. 
A bright-line test will also advance the goal of timely disclosure.  The 
current Form 8-K requires a report of board departures and additions341 
within four business days of the event.342  This Article proposes a similar 
deadline for disclosure of government pressure to change a board.  A bright-
line trigger should help reporting parties identify a reportable event quickly, 
without any need for lengthy legal consultation, and thereby meet this four-
day deadline. 
To ease compliance, permit rapid identification of instances in which a 
report is due, and capture the instances in which serious government 
pressure to change a board occurs, a Form GIB should be filed within four 
business days of: 
 
 337.  The securities laws have long been sensitive to this very consideration.  See, e.g., Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (noting the need to avoid setting too low a floor for 
materiality, as a “minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information within its reach” 
and produce “‘an avalanche of trivial information’”) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)). 
 338.  See, e.g., Non-Public Offering Exemption, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962) 
(describing the five-factor test for integration of offerings); HAZEN, supra note 216, § 4.24[1] 
(explaining the multifactor test for an exemption from registration under section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933). 
 339.  The legal test for materiality is very general, and the Supreme Court has rejected efforts to 
reduce that test to a bright-line criterion, even in specific contexts.  See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–21 (2011). 
 340.  To address the uncertainty created by the multifactor test for integrating offerings, the rules 
for exempt offerings include bright-line safe harbors that will ensure that offerings are not 
integrated.  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2012).  To address the uncertainty created by the 
multifactor test for the section 4(2) exemption from registration, the regulations governing exempt 
offerings include a detailed rule, which, if issuers comply with its more certain criteria, will exempt 
an offering from the 33 Act registration requirement.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012). 
 341.  Supra notes 148–50, 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 342.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at General Instruction B.1. 
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1. a communication by any federal government official in the 
executive branch (including any independent entity in that branch, 
such as the Federal Reserve), 
a. acting in his or her official capacity, 
b. directly or indirectly, 
2. with a public company’s chief executive officer, or any current 
board member, 
3. in which the government official, 
a. directs, requests, recommends, or states a preference that the 
company change its board membership (including any 
endorsement of a board change, where the company has 
requested such an endorsement, and any statement that the 
government does not object to a board change, where the 
company has asked whether the government objects or not), or 
b. states that the government will direct a change in board 
membership unless the company makes the change that the 
official identifies, or 
c. states that another government action, which affects the 
company, is more or less likely depending on whether the 
company changes its board membership. 
By limiting the trigger to contacts between the government and the 
corporation, the trigger will not require a report when the government, inter 
se, discusses the desirability of a board change.  By limiting the trigger to 
contacts with the highest executive in the public company or any member of 
the sitting board, the trigger will require a report only when the 
government’s direction, request, endorsement, or statement of preference is 
so serious that the government has communicated it to the very highest 
levels of the company.  By limiting the trigger to communications from an 
official in the executive branch acting in his or her official capacity, the rule 
permits any official to express a personal opinion without triggering a report.  
The “official capacity” limitation also forestalls GIB filings to report off-the-
cuff comments that do not reflect government policy. 
By mandating a filing when an executive branch official makes the 
reportable communication “indirectly,” as well as “directly,” the trigger aims 
to defeat efforts to bypass the disclosure requirement by communicating a 
direction, request, statement of preference, or endorsement to an 
intermediary such as a general counsel, and asking that the intermediary pass 
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the substance of the communication on to the CEO or the current board.  
Admittedly, including indirect contacts introduces a modicum of ambiguity.  
But without including “indirect” communications, the reporting rule could 
be easily bypassed.  Moreover, the securities laws and rules regularly 
employ the phrase “directly or indirectly,”343 so it is familiar to lawyers 
advising the reporting parties. 
Including communications by the government “directly or indirectly” 
with a company’s top executive or any board member would reach any case 
like BofA.  A government official might, by bureaucratic rule, address an 
MOU or other stylized communication to some particular corporate 
officer—such as a compliance officer—with the intention that the document 
travel to the CEO and the board.  Without including “indirect” 
communications in the new rule, such a bureaucratic routine could frustrate 
disclosure. 
Similar reasoning motivates the inclusion of communications in which 
the government endorses a board change that the company suggests, where 
the company seeks such an endorsement.  Without requiring disclosure of 
those contacts, the government and companies could defeat the disclosure 
mandate by simply adding a few steps to the dance.  For example, a top 
Treasury official might say to a board chair that the Treasury would like to 
“be in the loop” on board changes.  The board chair might then run 
prospective changes by some Treasury official, asking in each case whether 
the Treasury had an objection.  A government official stating that the 
Treasury had no objection would state a preference within the meaning of 
the rule, and the rule would therefore require a filing to report the Treasury’s 
blessing. 
To trigger a report, a communication must concern a “change in board 
membership.”  For this purpose a “change in board membership” means the 
departure of one or more directors or the addition of one or more directors.  
A departure includes a resignation, removal for cause, a failure to re-
nominate for another term, or a refusal to stand for reelection.  An addition 
includes the election of a director by the board between shareholder 
meetings or the nomination of a director candidate who is not an incumbent.  
The new rule would require a report when the government identifies 
 
 343.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (and related 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2012), prohibiting “any person” [from] “directly or indirectly” committing deceptive acts in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) 
(making it unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly” to make a tender offer without filing 
forms as the SEC requires if, after successful completion of the offer, the person would own more 
than five percent of an equity security registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act). 
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particular directors who should resign or be added, or when the government 
phrases the desired board change in more general terms, such as that some 
particular number or percentage of the directors should be replaced or that 
directors with particular characteristics should be added to the board. 
A communication triggers a report under this new rule not only when 
the government directs that a public company change its board but also 
when the government requests such a change or when the government states 
a preference for such a change.  Otherwise, the government could avoid a 
report by pressuring a company for a change without employing words that 
constituted a direction or even a request.  If a government official tells the 
CEO or a sitting director at a public company that the federal government 
prefers that the company change the membership of its board of directors, 
the CEO or director will almost certainly pass that statement of preference 
on to the board as a whole, and the board will almost certainly feel pressured 
to make the change. 
The other instances in which a communication triggers a report require 
little comment.  Clearly, the government applies pressure for board change 
when it tells a company’s top management or the company’s board that the 
government will order a change if the company does not make the change 
itself.  And a communication that government action is more or less likely 
depending on whether a company makes a board change is pressure of 
perhaps the most effective sort.  For example, the government could have 
very effectively exerted pressure on a bank during the credit crisis simply by 
stating that, unless the company changed its board, the government would be 
unlikely to provide financial assistance to the bank if the bank experienced 
financial distress. 
The new rule covers only communications from the executive branch 
and does not apply to communications between legislators and public 
companies.  The rule’s efficacy suffers to some extent as a result. Legislators 
can pressure companies and, if they affect board composition, their pressure 
implicates all the concerns previously set out.  But senators and 
representatives generally speak for themselves rather than for the branch of 
government of which they are a part, and so are less likely to wield effective 
pressure.  Moreover, a legislator may well actively seek publicity for any 
demand or request that he or she makes for a board change, believing that 
the publicity itself will increase the pressure that he or she applies.  
Therefore, required disclosure is likely not needed.  As set out below, just 
the opposite is true when an arm of the executive branch applies the 
pressure: there are sound reasons to conclude that the executive branch is 
unlikely to disclose the pressure it exerts absent a requirement that it do so.344 
 
 344.  See infra Part V.E. 
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C.  Who Should Disclose 
Logically, there are only two candidates on whom to impose the 
disclosure obligation: (i) the public company whose board composition the 
government tries to influence or (ii) the government itself.345  It is tempting 
to require the government to file.  As set out in Part V.A, the disclosure 
ideally should state why the government is trying to change the board.  The 
government knows its purpose better than the company.  Moreover, if (as 
Part V.A proposes) the report only includes the government’s reasoning 
when the government includes that reasoning in the triggering 
communication, the government can avoid inclusion of its purpose in a Form 
GIB filing simply by refraining from stating that purpose in the 
government’s communication with the company. 
While all of these reasons argue for imposing the filing requirement on 
the government, doing so invites implementation and enforcement problems.  
First, a government filing would require legislation.  Congress would need to 
except the new filing from Exchange Act section 3(c), the law that generally 
exempts the government from securities compliance.346  Second, the SEC is 
itself a part of the executive branch.347  It could prove awkward for the SEC 
to bring an enforcement action against another part of the executive branch 
for failing to file a Form GIB. 
On the other hand, the securities laws regularly impose disclosure 
obligations on public companies,348 and the Exchange Act provides the 
authority for a regulation requiring that companies file Form GIB.349  Those 
companies have internal staffs and protocols, as well as outside counsel, who 
routinely assist them in complying with disclosure obligations, so a 
compliance infrastructure is already in place.350  Moreover, the securities 
 
 345.  The current requirement lies with the company, see supra Part III.D, and the government is 
the only other party with influence regarding composition decisions under these circumstances. 
 346.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 347.  The SEC “is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch.”  Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).  The president appoints the SEC 
commissioners.  15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
 348.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006) (companies with stock registered under section 12 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act shall file with the SEC such information and reports as the SEC 
requires). 
 349.  The Commission could rely on sections 10, 12, 13, 15, and 23 of the Securities Exchange 
Act for the new form, just as it has for changes in Form 8-K.  Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,613 (Mar. 25, 2004). 
 350.  And companies already disclose government actions that the acting agencies do not disclose.  
For example, SEC investigations are confidential, and the agency accordingly does not publicize 
them.  17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2012).  Yet, companies may, under some circumstances, have to 
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laws provide the SEC with a panoply of enforcement tools to apply to 
companies, and individuals within them, who fail to file prescribed 
reports.351 
D.  Possible Objections and Exceptions 
The government might assert that disclosing its efforts to change boards 
will hurt, not help.  In particular, the government might argue generally, or 
in a particular case, that disclosing its efforts to change the board at a 
financial institution might cause a “run on the bank,” thereby forcing the 
closure of an institution that otherwise could have survived.  The 
government might also contend, either generally or in a particular case, that 
disclosing its attempts to effectively fire or hire directors at a company such 
as BofA could hurt that company’s innocent stockholders. 
Such arguments have little merit in most cases.  The proposal here is 
limited to those actions designed to change the boards at companies that are 
already publicly traded and that will continue to operate after the anticipated 
board change.352  Those companies already must file compendious financial 
information with the SEC in periodic reports (on Forms 10-Q and 10-K),353 
and in reports (on Form 8-K) addressing particularly important financial 
 
disclose them.  See Steven S. Scholes, An Overview of SEC Investigations and Enforcement 
Proceedings, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2011: INVESTIGATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF DODD-
FRANK 291, 315–17 (Practising Law Institute 2011).  The regulatory authorities already recognize 
that banks may in some circumstances have to disclose MOUs in SEC filings.  See supra note 119 
and accompanying text.  Some companies have disclosed MOUs.  See, e.g., First Chester Cnty. 
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 20, 2009). 
 351.  See 2 MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES ch. 12 
(2012). 
 352.  The proposal would therefore not affect any confidentiality required at the inception of a 
receivership under Title II of Dodd-Frank.  See Dodd-Frank, supra note 292, §§ 202(a)(1)(A)(iii), 
202(a)(1)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) & (C) (Supp. IV 2011)).  Although the 
receiver must “ensure that the [directors] responsible for the failed condition” of the failed financial 
institution “are removed,” 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (Supp. IV 2011), the receiver rather than the board 
runs the company during the receivership, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2011), and may 
exercise all powers of the board, § 5390(a)(1)(C)—in order to liquidate and wind up the financial 
institution, 5390(a)(1)(D).  See also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010) (“liquidation is the only option; 
the failing financial company may not be kept open or rehabilitated”).  Accordingly, the receivership 
inaugurates not board change at a company that will continue in business but replacement of the 
board by the receiver at a company that will go out of business.  Accordingly, communications about 
a receivership would not trigger a Form GIB filing. 
 353.  If a company trades on a national exchange, it must as a practical matter register under § 12 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).  15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2006).  
Companies registered under the Exchange Act must file reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-1 (2012) (requiring annual reports on the forms the SEC prescribes); 17 C.F.R. § 
249.310(a) (2012) (identifying Form 10-K as the default form for annual reports); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.13a-13 (2012) (requiring companies registered under section 12 to file Form 10-Q).  Both 
reports require financial statements and discussion of financial condition and results.  SEC Form 10-
K, supra note 140, at Items 7, 8; SEC, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at Part I, Items 1, 2 (2010). 
01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:07 PM 
[Vol. 40: 533, 2013] Investors Should Know 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
593 
events that occur between the periodic reports.354  Accordingly, if the 
government seeks to change a publicly traded company’s board for a reason 
related to financial missteps that threaten solvency, the public should in most 
cases already know of that dismal performance before the government acts.  
For example, it was clear to all—before the MOU with BofA in May 2009—
that BofA was experiencing severe financial distress.355  And the company’s 
stock price had already fallen by the time the government imposed the 
MOU.356  Moreover, neither the Wall Street Journal story on the MOU nor 
any of the announced director departures or arrivals in May through 
September of 2008 caused a run on the bank.357 
While the BofA case provides an instance in which disclosure of the 
government effort to change the board had no ill effects, it is possible that 
disclosure of such an effort might cause harm in some other case.  This 
section therefore proposes a narrow exception to the new disclosure 
requirement.  For the government to employ the exception, the new rule 
requires that, before filing a Form GIB, a public company must advise the 
government official making the triggering communication that the company 
is about to file.  The company will thereafter not file only if two conditions 
are satisfied: 
1. the most senior government officer at the government entity 
trying to make the board change notifies the company that he or she 
has concluded that disclosure would harm the public interest, and 
 
 354.  Companies registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act must file Forms 8-K, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, with an 8-K filing required after such financial developments as the 
creation of a direct or off-balance sheet financial obligation in a material amount, events that 
accelerate or increase such an obligation, material charges associated with exiting a business or 
disposing of a business, and impairment charges in material amounts.  SEC Form 8-K, supra note 
147 , at Items 2.03–2.06. 
 355.  BofA reported net income for the 2007 year of $14.982 billion.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 89 (Feb. 28, 2008).  The company reported net income of only $4.008 billion 
for 2008.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 110 (Feb. 27, 2009).  The company 
cut its quarterly dividend from $.64 per share to $.32 per share in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
reduced the dividend to $.01 per share in the first quarter of 2009.  Bank of Am. Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 13 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
 356.  The closing price of BofA’s stock plummeted from $ 53.33 per share on January 3, 2007, to 
$ 40.56 on January 2, 2008, to $ 14.33 on January 2, 2009, to $8.70 on May 1, 2009.  See Bank of 
America (BAC), Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=BofA+Historical+Prices. 
 357.  See supra Part II.B. 
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2. the government’s effort to change the company’s board is related 
to events that are not yet public. 
The government has two business days in which to provide this notification, 
and those two days do not count towards the four days within which the 
company must file the Form GIB. 
The first condition for the exception means that, if the communication 
by which the government exerted its influence originates from an office 
inside the Department of the Treasury, only the Secretary of the Treasury 
can make the determination that disclosure will harm the public interest.  If 
the communication originates from the Federal Reserve Bank, only the 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman can make the determination.  Requiring 
the official at the apex of that part of the government seeking board change 
to make a formal determination that disclosure will hurt the country provides 
accountability and emphasizes that such a determination to deprive investors 
and the public of disclosure is a serious matter and, hence, the rare 
exception. 
As a second, separate, and independent condition for the disclosure 
exception, the government can only prevent the Form GIB filing if the 
filing’s harm to the public interest results from secret circumstances.  Put 
another way, if the circumstances prompting the government to exercise its 
influence over the composition of the publicly traded company’s board are 
public knowledge, then the company must file the Form GIB—regardless of 
what any officer in the executive branch thinks about possible harm that the 
filing will cause.  This additional condition makes sense for two reasons.  
First, without some objective test of this sort, it will be all too easy for an 
executive branch official to conclude that a filing will harm the public 
interest because, for the reasons set out below, the filing will harm the 
government official.358  For example, an officer chary of being labeled a 
socialist if his or her effort to change a private company’s board is reported 
in the media might easily talk himself or herself into the conclusion that the 
public is better off not knowing of the effort at all.359 
The second reason derives from the circumstance that the harm to the 
public interest—for example by a run on the bank—will derive, most likely, 
not from the government’s intervention to change directors, but from some 
underlying condition that prompts that intervention.  Accordingly, if that 
underlying condition is already public, then the public interest is already 
likely to have suffered any “harm,” from that knowledge, with no additional 
harm likely from the subsequent revelation that the government is acting to 
 
 358.  See infra Part V.E. 
 359.  See infra notes 366–74 and accompanying text. 
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address the problem.360  On the other hand, if for example a bank is 
somehow in deep trouble that is not revealed by its own securities filings, 
and revelation of a federal effort to change the board might signal that 
distress and thereby cause a run, the case for an exception to the new 
disclosure strengthens. 
E.  Why Disclosure Must Be Required 
A final and critical question remains: if disclosure of government 
influence on public company board composition benefits investors and the 
rest of the public, why cannot we simply leave disclosure to the good 
thinking of those who control the government or those who control the 
companies?  They could take the template set out above and make voluntary 
disclosures. 
The BofA case361 provides an immediate response.  Though apparently 
dated in early May 2009,362 the BofA MOU did not surface until mid-July.363  
Even then, only a vigilant press brought that MOU to light.364  Neither the 
government nor BofA disclosed the document,365 which suggests that both 
had reasons for not doing so.  Voluntary disclosure did not get the job done. 
We do not know the motives for secrecy particular to the BofA case.  
But we can speculate on those motives intelligently based on the events 
during which that case unfolded.  With our understanding of human nature 
and the nature of government and corporations, we can also speculate more 
generally about the reasons that those in government, and those in 
corporations, may wish to keep Uncle Sam’s influence on board membership 
in the shadows. 
The government—really the individuals within the executive branch 
who are behind a board change—may want to keep their influence quiet in 
order to avoid political criticism for interference with private enterprise.  
The experience of 2008 and 2009 brings this home.  As the Treasury took 
equity positions in hundreds of banks and the government invested in AIG 
and General Motors,366 the dreaded word “nationalization” vibrated through 
 
 360.  As was the case with BofA.  See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text. 
 361.  See supra Part II.B. 
 362.  Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79 (“The order was imposed in early May. . . .”). 
 363.  Id. 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  See supra Part II.B.5. 
 366.  An early 2010 transaction report showed purchases of preferred stock, warrants, and debt 
obligations in hundreds of banks and financial institutions, as well as General Motors, GMAC, and 
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the financial press,367 with that word in popular parlance encompassing 
“effective control” of banks or other companies even without majority 
ownership.368  Pundits, politicians, and professors opined that nationalization 
was un-American.369  While the administration shied away from the term,370 
even the possibility of nationalization reportedly drove day-to-day stock 
market declines.371  Concerns emerged that, once started, nationalization 
would spread in a “contagion”372 and that, once the government got into the 
 
Chrysler.  U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Office of Financial Stability, Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
Transactions Report (Mar. 24, 2010) (on file with author). 
 367.  See Jonathan Alter, A Plan That Obama Can Bank On, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 2009, at 30 
(“The second option is to nationalize the banks.  True nationalization means permanent government 
ownership, which is favored only by a few aging socialists.  If things get bad enough, we could get a 
temporary takeover, but calling it nationalization just polarizes the debate.”); Andy Kessler, Why 
Markets Dissed the Geithner Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at A17 (“Six months to a year from 
now, big banks may still be weak and the ugly . . . word . . . nationalization will be back.”); Paul 
Krugman, Op-Ed., Wall Street Voodoo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A25 (“Washington remains 
deathly afraid of” that word.). 
 368.  See David E. Sanger, Selling a New Deal, but Promising It Will Be Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/us/politics/24web-sanger.html.  
 By the time Mr. Obama speaks, taxpayers may already own 40 percent of Citigroup.  
As Senator Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa, asked yesterday in a letter to Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner, wouldn’t that “give the government effective control of the 
bank, and therefore, be a de facto nationalization of the bank”? 
Id. 
 369.  A Princeton economist offered that “nationalization runs counter to deeply ingrained 
American traditions and attitudes.”  Alan S. Blinder, Nationalize? Hey, Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2009, § 3 (Money and Business), at 5.  Financial historian Charles Geisst agreed, saying that 
“[n]ationalization . . . ‘is just not a term in the American vocabulary.’”  David E. Sanger, US Bank 
and Trust?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1..  One columnist opined that “[f]ew words conjure the 
specter of radicalism quite so well as nationalization,” bringing to the popular mind visions of 
“leftist governments” and images of Lenin and Hugo Chavez.  David Leonhardt, The Way We Live 
Now: Banks of America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 11.  A publisher and 
commentator asked and answered: “Nationalize banks? A horror.”  Steve Forbes, 1933 Is Coming 
Again, FORBES, Mar. 16, 2009, at 13.  The Wall Street Journal reported that “Republicans already 
are uncomfortable with . . . the effective nationalization of . . . insurer AIG.”  Greg Hitt et al., 
Bailout Turns on Auto Makers’ Viability, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A3. 
 370.  See Edmund L. Andrews, Common Stock Offers Leeway in Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
20, 2009, at A1 (“Nationalization, or even just the hint of nationalization, is a politically explosive 
step that White House and Treasury officials have fought hard to avoid.”). 
 371.  See Jon Hisenrath et al., Heard on the Street: Banks Hit by Nationalization Fears, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 21, 2009, at A1 (“Shares of the biggest names in American banking plunged Tuesday as 
some investors feared that the government would need to nationalize the most deeply wounded 
financial institutions, wiping out shareholders.”). 
 372.  See Tyler Cowen, Three Rocky Roads to a Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, § 3 
(Money and Business), at 5. 
 The most obvious problem with nationalization is the risk of contagion.  If the 
government wipes out equity holders at some banks, why would investors want to put 
money into healthier but still marginal institutions?  A small number of planned 
nationalizations could thus lead to a much larger number of undesired nationalizations. 
Id. 
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banking business, it would be hard to get the government out.373  All of this 
evoked an even more reviled word—“socialism.”374 
Surely, no executive branch official seeking to influence board 
composition at a publicly traded company would relish triggering such a 
public relations firestorm.  He or she would, instead, seek to avoid even the 
remotest possibility of such a PR disaster.  The official would grasp at any 
rationale to keep actions behind the curtain. 
Executive officials might wish to proceed behind closed doors, as well, 
because an open effort could draw congressional attention, with the possible 
need to accommodate the idiosyncratic preferences of those legislators who 
might seek out cameras and microphones to express their views on the 
“right” directors to have at the company in question.  Again, the experience 
of 2008 and 2009 supports this fear, when representatives and senators 
sought to influence all kinds of actions taken by companies that the 
government was helping.  Congress politicized bonus payments at AIG.375  
Legislators used the bully pulpit to force companies to sell corporate 
planes.376  When the federal plan to restructure General Motors involved 
 
 373.  See Paul Ryan, A Republican Road to Economic Recovery, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2009, at 
A15 (“There are no easy or painless solutions, but the most damaging solution over the long term 
would be to nationalize our financial system.  Once we put politicians in charge of allocating credit 
and resources in our economy, it is hard to imagine them letting go.”). 
 374.  See Steve Lohr, Bold Action With Basis In History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1 
(“Elsewhere, government bank-investment programs are routinely called nationalization programs.  
But that is not likely in the United States, where nationalization is a word to avoid, given the 
aversion to anything that hints of socialism.”); Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Problem with 
‘Nationalization,’ WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A15 (addressing a Greenspan comment that bank 
nationalization occurs about once a century and Senator Graham’s view that nationalization should 
proceed if it works, a Cato Institute senior fellow opined: “That is the kind of pragmatism that leads 
to socialism.”). 
 375.  When AIG paid out $165 million in bonuses after the government bailout of that company, 
CEO Edward Liddy endured sharp questioning in congressional testimony even though he said he 
had asked bonus recipients to give back one half of the money; “Democratic leaders in Congress” 
were reportedly “furious” that the bonuses were paid.  Mary Williams Walsh & David M. 
Herszenhorn, A.I.G. Seeking Return of Half of Its Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1.  The 
House even passed a ninety percent retroactive tax on the bonuses.  Carl Hulse & David M. 
Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confronts an Upsurge of Populist Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2009, at A1. 
 376.  When the heads of the three auto companies flew into Washington on private jets to seek 
bailout assistance, legislators mocked the executives for their extravagance.  Robert Peele, They’d 
Rather Be Flying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/theyd-
rather-be-flying/.  Shortly thereafter, General Motors, though claiming not to act in response to 
public pressure, reduced its fleet of corporate planes from five to three.  Joseph Rhee & Maddy 
Sauer, GM Downsizing Jet Fleet, CEO Still Flies High, ABC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/WallStreet/story?id=6307092&page=1.  About two months later, the 
financial press reported that, “[f]acing outrage from some lawmakers, Citigroup now says that it will 
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closing dealerships, Congress held a hearing on that move.377  The executive 
branch might fear that publicly aired efforts to reconstitute a large 
company’s board would draw similar fire. 
Where Congress travels, so will lobbyists.  And the government officials 
suggesting or imposing a board change might wish to avoid lobbying by 
stakeholders in a corporation at which the government seeks board change.  
Lobbyists working for institutional investors, labor unions, and business 
affiliates, such as the car dealers in the case of General Motors, might pitch 
their board candidates, perhaps warning of political backlash should the 
names they suggest be ignored.  Finally, the government may believe that 
applying pressure cloaked from the public eye will serve some public 
purpose apart from politics, in particular protecting a financial institution 
from a run on the bank, as Part V.D discussed. 
The company whose board the government seeks to change may also 
want to avoid disclosure.  The sitting directors may, perhaps rightly, see the 
government pressure as a judgment that they have failed to properly 
discharge their duties.  In that case, the departing directors may prefer a low-
profile exit to headlines in business publications suggesting that they have 
been sent packing for poor performance.  The current directors may also fear 
that disclosure of government pressure to make changes at the very top of 
the corporation will hurt the company’s stock price.  Or the board and 
management might remain silent because the government demands that the 
company make no disclosure.  Indeed, if the company’s condition is such 
that it will change its board at the government’s behest, the company is 
probably in no condition to resist an additional admonition to keep the 
government role in corporate regime change on the QT.378 
For these several reasons, the public will not assuredly get disclosure 
unless it is required.  As in the BofA case, an enterprising press may bring to 
light government efforts to give the boot to some directors and a warm 
welcome to others.  But we cannot count on the press regularly defeating 
what could be coordinated company and government efforts to keep the 
pressure under wraps.  Only a disclosure requirement will get the news out 
reliably. 
 
not take delivery of a brand-new $50 million corporate jet.”  Cyrus Sanati, Citi Reverses Course on 
$50 Million Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/citi-reverses-
course-on-50-million-jet/. 
 377.  See Bernie Becker, Closing Dealers Is Painful but Vital, G.M. and Chrysler Tell Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2009, at B4. 
 378.  Or, as the younger crowd would say, on the DL. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The credit crisis—with its massive government investment in 
multimillion dollar publicly traded companies—has faded.  The government 
has unwound many of its investments and aims to unwind virtually all, if 
possible.379  Government control over public company boards by virtue of 
federal stock holdings—as at AIG—may therefore be rare, at least in the 
near future.  Moreover, as this Article has shown, investors (and the general 
public) can guess pretty intelligently about government control over board 
composition after a public revelation that the government has acquired 
majority shareholder voting rights at a company.380 
Unlike direct government investment in voting stock, however, bank 
regulation lives on today, complete with the power to issue MOUs that 
require board change.381  The BofA case, in which the government 
intervened without share-based voting power, could easily repeat itself.  And 
that case, as we have seen, was far more troublesome, as virtually no SEC 
rule required contemporaneous disclosure of government influence on 
director departures or arrivals at the bank.382  It is precisely to shed light on 
that worse case that the SEC should adopt the disclosure rule that this Article 
advocates.  For when the government takes control of a board, the 
government knows.  The company knows.  Investors should know, too. 
  
 
 379.  When the government restructured its investment in AIG in early 2011, see supra note 19, 
the Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Financial Stability labeled the AIG transaction a 
“milestone in the government’s long-stated efforts to exit our investments in private companies as 
soon as practical while protecting taxpayers.”  Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Prepares to Sell Part of 
A.I.G. Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/a-i-g-plans-big-
sale-of-treasurys-shares-next-quarter/.  And the government has indeed sold all of its AIG common 
stock.  See supra note 19. 
 380.  See supra Part II.A.4. 
 381.  See FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6. 
 382.  See supra Part II.B, Part III.E. 
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